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INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, raise important issues
concerning the vulnerability of Western states to attack by sea as
well as by air.' Each year in the United States alone eight thousand
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ships make fifty-one thousand port calls and deliver approximately
seven and a half million overseas containers.2 Of those seven and a
half million containers,3 only two percent are actually inspected4 and
1. See Canadian Security and Military Preparedness Fifth Report to the
Canadian Standing S. Comm. on Nat'l Security and Defence, (2002) [hereinafter
Canadian Senate Report] (discussing the vulnerabilities of ports and shipping to
terrorist attack), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-E/defe-e/rep-
e/rep05feb02-e.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002); Weak Links: Assessing the
Vulnerability of U.S. Ports and Whether the Government is Adequately Structured
to Safeguard Them. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
106th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter U.S. Senate Hearing] (investigating the
vulnerabilities of seaports as matter of national security), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-govaffairs/ 120601 witness.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2002); see also Tom Blackwell, Ottawa To Study Ports' Vulnerability to
Terrorists, NAT'L POST, Aug. 24, 2002, at A3 (discussing recent efforts of both
governments regarding port security).
2. See Adm. James M. Loy & Capt. Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard,
Global Trade: America's Achilles Heel, J. HOMELAND SECURITY, Feb. 18, 2002
(discussing maritime traffic in the United States), at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.asp?article=33
(last visited Oct. 19, 2002); see also By the Numbers, COUNTER TERRORISM &
SECURITY REP., (Sept./Oct. 2001) (demonstrating that there is some variation in
maritime traffic statistics depending on the source).
3. There are two sizes of standardized container: 20x8x8, which are referred
to as TEU's or Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, and 40x8x8, which are referred to as
Forty-foot Equivalent Units or FEU's. See Loy & Ross, supra note 2 (discussing
container sizing and standards). In the logistics industry, most measurements are
given in relation to twenty-foot equivalent units and unless otherwise indicated,
references in this paper to "container" will mean TEU.
4. See Allison Dunfield, Billions More Urged For the Military, GLOBE &
MAIL, Mar. 1, 2002 (explaining that this rate of inspection is not abnormal in
comparison to other Western countries and that Canada inspects approximately
three percent of its containers). U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner
takes issue with the criticism of the two percent inspection rate and he maintains
that the two percent screening is more effective than critics suggest because it is
based on a "multi-layered strategy of risk management" that targets high-risk
containers. See Robert C. Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and
International Studies 6 (Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter CSIS Speech], available at
http://www.customs.gov/about/speeches/speech0 117-02.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2002). He notes that,
Much has been made recently of the fact that U.S. Customs manages to
inspect only about 2 percent of the total volume of trade entering the country
each year[;] [t]aken alone, this statistic sounds alarmingly low. But Customs
inspections are not based on random selection-say, one out of fifty is based
upon a sophisticated targeting process.
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each inspection takes an average of three hours per container.5 This
inability to verify the contents of containers and the general lack of
inspection suggests that containers could be used by terrorist
organizations as an effective means to transport weapons of mass
destruction into Western ports or even as a means for terrorists
themselves to circumvent immigration control.6 This lack of
verifiable information about cargo carried by foreign ships is
compounded by a complete absence of information on the
backgrounds of crewmembers operating vessels and whether the
ships themselves have implemented appropriate security measures.
In terms of legal regimes, the international community has never
seriously attempted to address the issue of the prevention of maritime
terrorism.' The focus in the past has been on the exertion of
jurisdiction once an attack has occurred.8 The 1985 hijacking of the
Id.
5. See Stephen E. Flynn, Beyond Border Control, FOREIGN AFF. Nov./Dec.
2000, at 57, 59 (explaining that the three-hour inspection time is based on the five-
man team conducting a thorough physical examination of a forty foot container).
6. See Susan Kelleher, Big Hole in Nation's Defenses: Our Ports, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at Al (highlighting a situation in October 2001 when Italian
inspectors discovered a suspected al Qaeda member hiding in a container, destined
for Toronto, fitted with a bed and makeshift toilet), available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=seaport28mO&date=20011028&query=susa
n+kelleher (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
7. The absence of an effective international legal regime to prevent terrorism
is not limited only to maritime matters. Frequently, attempts to address terrorism in
international law have become mired in political debates over the underlying
causes of terrorism and the legitimacy of wars of national liberation. See Abraham
D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1986, at 901, 901-04
(providing an example of political debate surrounding international proposals to
address terrorism). Developing states are often critical of Western definitions of
terrorism. One of the most notable examples of this type of debate occurred in
1972 when U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim sought to include an item on
the U.N. agenda that dealt with the prevention of terrorism. See id. (noting the
objections raised to Waldheim's proposals and the difficulties associated with
addressing terrorism). Some states objected on the basis that such discussion might
serve to undermine the General Assembly's principles concerning the legitimacy
of the struggle by colonial and dependent people who were seeking independence.
Id. at 901-05.
8. See id. at 901-05 (discussing diplomatic and military efforts in response to
terrorist activity).
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Achille Lauro9 drew worldwide attention to the issue and prompted
the International Maritime Organization ° ("IMO") to respond with
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation." The Convention seeks to ensure
that states will either prosecute or extradite those responsible for
terrorist acts that occur at sea.' 2 In many respects, achieving
9. On October 7, 1985, a group of Palestinians from the Popular Liberation
Front seized the Achille Lauro, an Italian registered cruise ship, in Egypt's
territorial waters, and asked for the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli
jails. In response to Israel's refusal, the terrorists murdered an elderly Jewish U.S.
citizen, Leon Klinghoffer. Egypt negotiated the release of the hostages and took
the terrorists into custody, but did not actually arrest them. Subsequently, the
hijackers boarded an Egypt Air flight to Tunisia. Under U.S. pressure, Tunisia did
not allow the aircraft to land. U.S. Navy fighters eventually forced the aircraft
down at a NATO airfield in Italy where a standoff occurred between U.S. and
Italian authorities over which government had jurisdiction. The Italian government
denied the U.S. requests for extradition and tried the hijackers in Italy. The leader
of the operation, Abu Abbas, was eventually allowed to leave Italy through-
Yugoslavia. See, e.g., John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Seized, Hijackers
Demand Release of 50 Palestinians In Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al
(describing the hijacking incident); Judith Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt;
Passenger Slain, 400 Are Safe; U.S. Assails Deal With Captors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1985, at Al (discussing U.S. objections to a negotiated deal); Bernard
Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hijackers; Fighters Divert it to NATO
Base in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial in Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1985, at A10 (addressing the U.S. actions to stop flight from landing in Tunisia).
10. See Basic Facts About the IMO, in Focus ON THE IMO 1, 1-3, (Mar. 2000)
(discussing the structure and functioning of the IMO), available at
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data-id%3D710/Basics.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2002). The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations and
was the first international body dedicated to maritime matters. Established
pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, the IMO was inaugurated in 1959. It is principally concerned with
technical matters in relation to ship source pollution and safety. The Organization
consists of an Assembly and a Council along with four main Committees: the
Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the
Legal Committee, and the Technical Co-operation Committee.
11. See Convention and Protocol from the International Conference on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO
Doc. SUA/CON/15 (1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) [hereinafter SUA]
(The Convention was concluded simultaneously with the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, which was designed to protect oil platforms and incorporates
the SUA).
12. See id. art. 6(3) (establishing jurisdiction for specific crimes committed at
sea).
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consensus on the prosecution of terrorists is easier than establishing a
prevention regime that may engage issues such as state responsibility
for the prevention of terrorism, Flags of Convenience, 3 jurisdictional
issues, and port state control.
This paper examines some of the legal issues surrounding the
prevention of maritime terrorism and argues that states have a
positive duty to prevent maritime terrorism. However, at present,
many practical and legal problems persist regarding the fulfillment of
this duty. Section II of this paper seeks to define the security
problems and highlights some of the practical problems associated
with attempting to increase security in international multimodal14
systems.' 5 At present, the greatest threats to security emanate from
the cargo, the crew, and the actual vessel itself. Section III addresses
whether customary international law imposes a duty on states to
prevent maritime terrorism, and if so, the scope or limit of the duty. 6
13. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 91-92, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (explaining that ships
possess the nationality of the state in which they are registered and are
subsequently subject to the laws of that jurisdiction), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2002). Flags of Convenience refer to states that allow the
registration of vessels with minimal regulatory requirements with respect to labor,
safety, and ownership regulations. See RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT ROCHDALE,
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO SHIPPING: REPORT 172 (1970) (defining Flags of
Convenience and providing the primary source for defining Flags of Convenience);
see also H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 156-58 (1996);
Brassed off- Flags of Convenience Under Threat, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2002, at
65 (recognizing that although such open ship registries have long raised safety and
labor concerns, they are now also identified as security risks), available at 2002
WL 7246214.
14. Multimodality or intermodalism involves the integration of different modes
of transportation such as rail, road, and sea, by means of a single shipping
container. Multimodal systems charge a single through-rate to the shipper and
employ a single set of shipping documents regardless of the number of modes or
the number of shippers involved. See Richard W. Palmer & Frank P. DeGuilio,
Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 281, 283-84 (1989) (addressing the use of multimodal carriage and its
advantages and future in shipping).
15. See infra notes 20-127 and accompanying text (describing weaknesses of
the current infrastructure and system, and the ensuing obstacles to improvement).
16. See infra notes 128-175 and accompanying text (examining the
responsibility and duty of states to take action to prevent terrorist attacks).
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Section IV closely examines the inadequacy of existing international
law on maritime terrorism, including the shortcomings of the 1982
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 7 ("UNCLOS") and
the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation. 8 This paper argues that it is
necessary to move beyond the piracy analogies of the past, toward a
more comprehensive prevention-oriented regime. Section V
discusses the possibility for the creation of such a regime. 9
I. DEFINING THE SECURITY PROBLEM
This section discusses three distinct, yet related, security problems
in the area of international maritime shipping. The first, and possibly
the most difficult to deal with, is the risk presented by containerized
shipping. 0 The shift over the last forty years to containerization in
the transportation of general cargo has reduced transparency in the
shipping industry and has greatly enhanced the potential risk of
terrorist attack.21 The second threat comes from the lack of
knowledge about seafarers. 22 Port authorities have virtually no
knowledge about the background of the foreign crewmembers who
operate vessels within their ports.23 The third and most obvious threat
is related to the lack of security onboard the vessels themselves.24
17. UNCLOS, supra note 13.
18. See infra notes 176-215 and accompanying text (discussing the
shortcomings of current international legal regimes pertaining to maritime
terrorism, through an analysis of the UNCLOS and SUA).
19. See infra notes 216-249 and accompanying text (making recommendations
for a new regime to respond to the current threats of maritime terrorism).
20. See infra notes 25-99 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
containerization and its vulnerability).
21. See Michael Grey, Security-Abandon Secrecy in Global Fight Against
Terror Says Register, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Jan. 31, 2002, at 3 (suggesting that a
"love of secrecy" exists within the industry that leads to national governments'
attempts to increase transparency), available at 2002 WL 8245570.
22. See infra notes 100-111 and accompanying text (noting the lack of
information about the identity of seafarers).
23. CSIS Speech, supra note 4, at 5-6.
24. See infra notes 112-127 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
adequate ship security).
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This paper examines these issues largely in an American context and
focuses mainly on the threat stemming from containerization.
A. CONTAINERIZATION
Over the centuries, many attempts have been made to simplify and
improve the handling of marine cargo. Success was achieved with
bulk commodities by replacing casks and barrels with vessels
specifically designed to transport oil, coal, and grain.25 However, for
many years very little progress occurred in the area of "general
cargo."26 Until the mid-1950s, general cargo was handled "break-
bulk" style.27 Packages were loaded on to trucks or rail cars at the
factory and then transported to a port and unloaded.28 Each parcel
was then hoisted onboard a vessel and braced for an ocean crossing.
Once the ship arrived at its destination, the entire process would
occur again in reverse. This system was highly inefficient, created
multiple opportunities for theft, and often resulted in the cargo
arriving damaged or destroyed.
After World War II, economic necessity dictated a need for a more
efficient handling of general cargo.29 Research indicated that the
existing systems needed vast improvement.30 The real revolution did
not occur until the mid-1950s when Malcolm McLean,3 owner of a
25. See MARK L. CHADWIN ET AL., OCEAN CONTAINER TRANSPORTATION 1
(1990) (noting the shift to specifically designed vessels).
26. See Palmer & DeGiulio, supra note 14, at 285-86 (discussing developments
in general cargo). Despite the lack of progress in improving general cargo
handling, considerable thought was given to the matter long before the
revolutionizing of the industry in 1950s. Id. Englishman James Anderson
articulated the first plan for containerization in 1801. Id. Anderson was
subsequently granted a patent for containerization in Great Britain in 1845, but
apparently did not implement the system. See id.
27. See CHADWIN ET AL., supra note 25 (explaining break-bulk style cargo
handling).
28. See id. (discussing traditional transport methodology).
29. See HERMAN D. TABAK, CARGO CONTAINERS 1 (1970) (discussing the
shipping changes after World War II).
30. Id.
31. See Barry Rascovar, Shipping Pioneer Largely Ignored, BALT. SUN, June
14, 2001, at 23A (noting McLean's accomplishments), available at 2001 WL
6162184.
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North Carolina trucking firm, purchased a small shipping line and
implemented a system of "containerization."32 McLean believed that
by moving the entire trailer instead of individual packages, the goods
would only have to be handled twice; once at the factory door and
then again at the door of the recipient.33 The implementation of this
new system of containerization created positive economic benefits
for both shippers and ship owners. Using the old break-bulk method,
ships often took days to unload, but by utilizing a containerized
system, a ship could be unloaded and reloaded in a matter of hours.
3 4
This fast turn-around time reduced port fees and allowed ships to
make faster circuits, thereby reducing the number of ships required
to service ports.35
It is the very efficiency of containerized systems that today makes
them a potential security threat. The lack of transparency in modem
multimodal systems helps immunize cargo from theft,3 6 but at the
same time, it creates an enhanced security risk. The emphasis on
speed means that cargo is rarely inspected and the only parties with
true knowledge of the contents of the container are the shipper and
32. See CHADWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 1-2 (discussing the innovations of
McLean). Though McLean came up with his idea for containerization in 1937, he
did not implement it until the 1950s when he purchased the Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Company. Id. In 1956, McLean converted a World War 11 tanker named
Ideal X to carry freight by rigging fifty-eight containers to the ship's deck. Id. The
new system proved successful and he subsequently changed the name of the
company to Sea-Land Service Inc. Id. The company developed into one of the
world's largest container shipping lines and was eventually sold to R.J. Reynolds
in 1969. See Wolfgang Saxon, Malcom McLean Container-Shipping Pioneer, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 19, 2001, at B7 (remembering highlights of the life
of Malcom McLean), available at 2001 WL 6463326; see also All Things
Considered: Interview with Paul Richardson (NPR radio broadcast, May 29, 2001)
(discussing the life and career of Malcom McLean), available at 2001 WL
9434939.
33. See CHADWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at I (discussing McLean's
innovations).
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id.
36. See When Trade and Security Clash, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 59, 60
(recognizing that while containerization initially reduced petty theft, it appears to
have increased by a considerable amount the value of those thefts that do occur),
available at 2002 WL 7245753. In other words, containerization has promoted
criminal efficiency. Id. at 60.
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the recipient. It may be argued that speed and security correlate in a
type of inversely proportional relationship whereby increasing one
variable decreases the other.37
In reality, there is no knowledge of what ships bring into a country
or what exactly is sitting on quays at major seaports for the purposes
of import or export. The former Commissioner of the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports confirmed this
at a Senate hearing when she spoke about a supposed "fire truck"
destined for China. 38 She stated that to her Department's surprise,
when the container was opened, "[t]he vehicle resembled a tank and
had a turret for spraying pepper gas" and because it was "exported in
a container... no one knew at the time of export what was inside."39
This lack of transparency and the emphasis on speed over security
suggests that shipping and seaports are very vulnerable to terrorist
attack. Commander Stephen Flynn of the U.S. Coast Guard recently
posited a hypothetical situation in which a terrorist organization
wanting to deliver a weapon of mass destruction by container could
purchase an overseas exporter with an established trade record with
the United States and use the shipper as a front.40 He notes:
The container could have a global positioning system (GPS) device so it
could be tracked as it moved through Singapore or Hong Kong to mingle
with the more than half a million containers handled by each of these
ports every month. It could arrive in the United States via Long Beach or
Los Angeles and be loaded directly on a railcar for the transcontinental
trip. Current regulations do not require an importer to file a cargo
manifest with the U.S. Customs Service until the cargo reaches its "entry"
port-in this case, Newark, 2,800 miles of U.S. territory away from where
37. See Speed Versus Security, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Mar. 4, 2002, at 7
(suggesting that the task of increasing both speed and security simultaneously in
the shipping industry may in fact be impossible), available at 2002 WL 8246696.
38. U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of F. Amanda DeBusk).
39. Id.
40. See Stephen E. Flynn, Homeland Security is a Coast Guard Mission, U.S.
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDING, Oct. 2001, at 72, 73 (explaining the Coast Guard's
ability to defend the United States against attacks at vulnerable ports), available at
2002 WL 8246696; see also Gil Klein, U.S. Urges Closer Checks on Cargo
Containers, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 2002, at A9 (recognizing that
politicians and those in the media frequently refer to this type of scenario as the
"nuke-in-a-box" or "bomb-in-a-box").
2002]
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it first entered the country-and the importer is permitted 30 days' transit
time to make the trip to the East Coast.
41
Flynn points out that the container could then be detonated at a
major rail hub, such as Chicago, producing a continent-wide
disruption of transportation that would have devastating economic
results.4 2
Flynn's hypothetical scenario is even more troubling when put in
the context of the trend in recent years towards the use of larger
vessels and the creation of what are known as "megaports."43 These
two factors have heightened the vulnerability of the maritime
transportation system to terrorist attack. The new super or post-
Panamax vessels 44 now carry upwards of six thousand individual
41. Flynn, supra note 40, at 73.
42. ld;. see International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, U.N. Doc.A/RES/52/164, art. 2(l)(b) (2001). The Convention
specifically criminalizes a bombing action designed to produce economic loss:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates
an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system or an
infrastructure facility...
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or
system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major
economic loss.
Id.; see also Samuel M. Witten, The International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 774 (discussing the
various provisions of the Convention).
43. See John G. Fox, Sea Change in Shipping, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, May 2001, at 62, 65 (defining megaports by their ability to
efficiently handle large vessels and volumes of containers, and suggesting that they
have the following characteristics: (1) container berths of at least fifteen meters
deep at all tides; (2) a minimum quay length of 330 meters; and (3) a crane
outreach of at least forty-eight meters); The Economic Impact of Port
Regionalization and Expansion, TEX. S. INTERIM COMM. ON NATURAL RES. REP.,
77th Leg., at 35-36 (2000) [hereinafter Texas Senate Report] (stating that
megaports also require an on dock or adjacent intermodal rail yard, three or more
heavy lift cranes for offloading per berth, and a minimum of seventy-five acres of
space for each megaship berth).
44. See Texas Senate Report, supra note 43, at 29. These vessels are referred to
as post-Panamax because they are too large to fit through the Panama Canal. Id.
There are currently three different categories of container vessels in operation:
350 [18:341
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containers 45 and require ports that can accommodate ships with a
draft of forty-five feet. 46 This means that traditional ports such as
Hong Kong and Oakland are unable to handle the new vessels, and
that in the future, shipping will become concentrated in a small
number of "megaports" that will serve as hubs in a hub and spoke
feeder system.47 As one analyst has recently suggested, the disruption
of business at a megaport would have greater implications for trade
than the blocking of a major maritime choke-point such as the Suez
Canal 8.4  He points out that "[s]hips can circumnavigate a choke-
point, but there may be no alternative megaport through which to
divert a cargo" as they are distributed unevenly throughout the
world. 9 Megaports could be rendered unusable not only by the use
of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon, but simply by the claim
that a container holds a weapon of mass destruction.50 A simple
threat of this nature could result in the closure of a port for days
while authorities conducted a thorough search.5' This would have
Feeder vessels that typically have less than 1000 TEU capacity, Panamax and Sub-
Panamax which have a 1000-4000 TEU capacity and are able to utilize the Panama
Canal and Post-Panamax which have a capacity of greater than 4000 TEU and are
unable to pass through the Canal. Id. The trend in the industry is toward fewer
ships carrying larger numbers of containers. At present, there are vessels in
development that are designed to carry up to 15,000 containers. See also U.S.
Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of Robert Quartel), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-govaffairs/ 120601 quartel.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2002); Terence Smythe, Heavy Weight Boxing, BALTIC WORLD PORTS (discussing
the size and capacity of post-Panamax ships, specifying that the newer super-post-
Panamax ships is on average twenty to twenty-two containers wide), available at
http://www.thebaltic.com/supplements/World%20Ports/index.htm (last visited Oct.
17, 2002).
45. Fox, supra note 43, at 63.
46. CHADWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 116.
47. See Fox, supra note 43, at 63 (discussing a system of shipping with
megaports).
48. John G. Fox, Sea Change: Strategic Consequences of the Transformation
of World Shipping 4 (2000) (unpublished thesis, National Defense University) (on
file with author).
49. Fox, supra note 43, at 63-64.
50. Id. at 64 (explaining why megaports are more vulnerable to attack).
51. See Aviva Freudmann, Global Traffic Tops 200 Million TEUs, but Revenue
Lags, J. OF COM., May 11, 2000, at 1 (recognizing that the importance of these
ports cannot be overstated). Approximately two hundred million containers are
2002]
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grave economic repercussions for manufacturers, shipping lines, and
for the smaller feeder ports that rely on a centralized "hub.15 2 The
mere threat of an attack could produce a poisoned global shipping
network.
Just as an attack on a major port or rail hub would have a
devastating economic impact on the North American economy, so
too would the implementation of a security regime that slowed the
flow of foreign goods to the manufacturing sector. As logistical and
manufacturing processes have become more efficient, manufacturers
have reduced capital expenditures by decreasing their inventories and
relying on just-in-time delivery of parts and supplies. 3 This system
of "in-transit inventory" has been one of the major factors in
productivity growth in the last ten years. 4 However, it adds an
element of economic fragility to any disruption of the transportation
system.5 Though not as reliant on sea transportation, this type of
moved between ports annually. Id. Any disruption, even a minor one, would have
significant economic ramifications. Id.
52. See Nancy Cleeland & Louis Sahagun, West Coast Ports Brace for a Storm
of Labor Negotiations, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at Cl, available at 2002 WL
2473333 (noting that it is difficult to determine the economic costs of a closure of
all U.S. ports, but that recent labor trouble at West coast ports provides some
indication of the magnitude of the economic costs associated with even limited
port closures). The White House estimated that the labour disruption at West Coast
ports in October 2002 cost the U.S. economy one billion dollars a day. While the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco estimated the cost to be
two billion dollars per day. See Wendy Stueck, U.S. Port Dispute Causing Delays
in Vancouver, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 8, 2002, at B2.
53. See When Trade and Security Clash, supra note 37, at 60 (explaining that
improvements in logistical systems have caused the ratio of inventory to GDP in
the United States to fall from twenty-five percent to fifteen percent).
54. See Loy & Ross, supra note 2 (noting that productivity improvements were
due to warehoused inventory being replaced by in-transit inventory).
55. See Peter Brieger, Just-in-time Deliveries the Japanese Way: Honda to Fly
in Steel, NAT'L POST, June 29, 2002, at FPI (stating that as a result of the sudden
imposition of steel tariffs by the United States in June 2002, one Japanese
automaker contemplated the costly solution of flying steel from Japan to Canada in
order to keep Canadian production lines operating), available at 2002 WL
22468223. The reduction of inventories and the shift to "in- transit inventories" has
resulted in small economic or logistical changes being potentially disastrous for
industries. Id.; see also Clare Ansberry, Just-in-time Deliveries Slow Down U.S.
Recovery. Orders From Manufacturers are Smaller, More Rushed as Economic
Anxiety Lingers, GLOBE & MAIL, June 25, 2002, at B13 (noting that just-in-time
deliveries are disrupting supply chains).
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fragility is most apparent in the auto sector, where manufacturers
now have as little as a six hour lead time between when the order is
placed and when the purchaser expects it to be delivered. 6 After the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the wait to cross the Canada-
U.S. border was approximately eleven hours, resulting in the closure
of six auto plants on the Detroit side of the border.5" The cost of a
single idle assembly plant may run a manufacturer as much as a
million dollars per hour. 8 Similar economic costs from a disruption
of the maritime supply chain were clearly evident in the recent ten-
day labour dispute at U.S. west coast ports.5 9
This new vulnerability in the maritime sector is in many respects a
product of the success of free trade and liberalized economic policies
that allow for the free movement of goods across international
boundaries. 60 It is a vulnerability that owes its genesis to economic
success. As Stephen Flynn points out, efforts to increase regulatory
enforcement at ports and borders "may result in a cure that is worse
than the disease. ' 61 The unilateral increase in inspection procedures
in one country may result in overseas purchasers avoiding particular
ports for fear that goods will arrive damaged or spoiled. 62 Flynn
suggests that if U.S. authorities find themselves having to "turn off
the maritime container spigot," the United States will have engaged
in a self-imposed blockade of its own economy.
63
56. See, e.g., Peter Brieger, U.S. Port Dispute Halts Honda Again, NAT'L
POST, Oct. 21, 2002, at FP4 (noting in October 2002, a labour dispute at U.S. ports
twice halted car assembly lines because of a lack of parts).
57. See Loy & Ross, supra note 2 (stating the consequence of long delays on
production at automobile manufacturing plants on the Detroit side of the port).
58. See Flynn, supra note 5, at 59 (noting the costs incurred if manufacturing is
stalled because parts are delayed in inspection).
59. See Gabriel Kahn Trish Saywell & Queena Sook, Backlogged Ports Spell
Big Trouble for Toyland: Shutdown Offers Dramatic Illustration of Fragility of
Modern Global Supply Chain, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 21, 2002, at B8 ( noting that
even modest disruptions in the supply chain can have dramatic and prolonged
economic costs)
60. See id. at 62 (explaining that security measures that hinder trade are seen as
a nuisance).
61. Id. at 58.
62. See id. (noting that buyers will avoid ports with known delays).
63. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen E. Flynn)
(noting the importance of container shipping to the U.S. economy), available at
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
There are few easy solutions to the threats posed by containers to
maritime security. The most obvious solution is to intercept the
threat offshore, thereby limiting any potential damage.64 As
Commander Flynn points out:
[a] busy waterfront pier in Los Angeles or Seattle is hardly an optimal
place to find and defuse a bomb. A better approach would be to intercept
the vessel carrying the weapon offshore. If a shore side solution is
required, the vessel could be escorted to a less vulnerable locale.
65
There are several problems with this solution. The first is that
searching a container vessel at sea is not possible. Many of the post-
Panamax ships now carry in excess of six thousand containers.66
Each container is "from 20-48 feet in length, 8 wide and high, and
can weigh 20 tons or more and be stacked 9 deep in the hold of a
container ship."67 The unloading of a container vessel requires highly
specialized cranes that can lift between thirty and fifty tons and, in
the case of post-Panamax ships, the cranes must be able to extend
beyond sixteen rows of containers. 68 Further, Flynn's suggestion that
a ship could be diverted to a less vulnerable locale for inspection 69 is
also not realistic in light of the fact that post-Panamax ships require
ports that accommodate vessels with a draft of up to forty-five feet. 0
The only real solution is to turn the ship back to the point of
http://www.senate.gov/~gov-affairs/120601flynn.htm (last visited October 19,
2002).
64. See Flynn, supra note 40, at 74 (explaining the difficulty and danger of
waiting to detect a vessel until it is in a busy port).
65. Id.
66. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of Robert Quartel)
(informing that some ships now carry more than 6500 containers).
67. Id.
68. See CHADWIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 23 (explaining the capacity of a
typical ship-to-shore crane).
69. See Flynn, supra note 5, at 59 (stating that if inspection is not feasible in a
busy port, then the ship should be diverted to a different port).
70. See id. at 59 (suggesting that after the Panamax hurdle was crossed, post-
Panamax vessels would have drafts of forty-five feet or more).
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departure." In any new maritime security regime, secure control of
the ship and cargo prior to departure will be a key aspect.
The favored solution in the United States is the concept of pushing
U.S. borders outward.12  Robert Bonner, the U.S. Customs
Commissioner, has indicated that his goal is to "push our sphere of
activities outward, from points of entry in the United States to points
of origin abroad."73 He suggests that "[w]e must expand our
perimeter of security away from our national boundaries and towards
foreign points of departure. We can no longer think of 'the border'
merely as a physical line separating one nation from another."74 In
other words, any inspection of maritime cargo would occur in other
countries before the cargo is loaded on board a vessel bound for the
United States. Robert Quartel, an industry representative testifying
before the U.S. Senate, has indicated that "[c]argoes that are
identified as suspicious should be detained ... prior to loading on a
ship for transport into or through the United States - rather than in
the U.S. port itself."75
Suggestions such as these have resulted in the U.S. Customs
Service announcing that it would implement the Container Security
Initiative ("CSI").76 The program has four key elements: (1)
establishment of criteria for the identification of high risk containers
71. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of Stephen E. Flynn)
(explaining that point-of-origin controls are imperative to security).
72. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Robert Quartel)
(urging that suspicious cargos should be detained before they reach a U.S. port);
see also Jan Cienski, U.S. Wants Agents in Canadian Ports: Fears 'Nuke in a
Box:' Critics See Erosion of Sovereignty, NAT'L POST, Jan. 18, 2002 (noting that
the United States is considering placing Customs agents in Canadian ports),
available at 2002 WL 4163398. See generally U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 1
(noting Stephen E. Flynn's statement about the importance of point-of-source
controls outside U.S. jurisdiction).
73. Cienski, supra note 72.
74. Port and Maritime Security Act Implementation: Hearing on Security at
U.S. Seaports Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Bonner Statement] (statement of Commissioner
Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs Service) (stating that Customs needs to
implement security outside of the U.S. border), available at 2002 WL 2010946.
75. U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of Robert Quartel).
76. See CSIS Speech, supra note 4 (proposing the new Container Security
Initiative which was then referred to as the "Container Security Strategy").
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"based on advance information and risk targeting;" (2) pre-screening
of containers before they arrive in the United States; (3) the full
utilization of "technology to prescreen high risk containers;" and (4)
the "use of smart and secure containers."77 Due to the emphasis on
pre-screening, a program of this type requires cooperation on the part
of other states. Initially, the Customs Service is seeking to involve
those foreign ports with the largest volume of container traffic
destined for the United States." However, the ultimate goal of the
program is to have some level of pre-screening at all ports of
departure regardless of size and traffic volume.
The CSI obviously requires having U.S. inspectors in foreign ports
applying U.S. customs regulations. The United States has already
posted customs inspectors in Canada to open and inspect containers
in the ports of Halifax and Vancouver79 and it has begun to expand
CSI to include European ports.80 Though this may appear to be a
solution, it raises the important issue of state sovereignty among
American allies.8 Furthermore, it would appear to be totally
77. See Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs Service, Remarks at
the American Association of Port Authorities (Mar. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.customs.gov/about/speeches/speech0319-O0.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2002).
78. See Container Security Initiative to Safeguard U.S. Global Economy, U.S.
CUSTOMS TODAY, Mar. 2002 (stating that the top ten ports of departure for goods
destined to the United States are: Hong Kong, China; Shanghai, China; Kaohsiung,
Taiwan; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Pusan, South Korea; Bremerhaven, Germany;
Tokyo, Japan; Genoa, Italy; and Yantian, China), available at
http://www.customs.gov/custoday/mar2002/csi.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
79. See Cienski, supra note 72 (discussing customs Commissioner Bonner's
comment that "the placement of Customs inspectors in Canada is a first step in...
our efforts to 'push the border outwards"').
80. See Marlise Simons, American Antiterror Inspections Will Begin At 3
European Ports, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, at A12 (stating that the United States
received permission to place customs officials in the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp,
and Le Havre, and is seeking agreements with Spain, Italy, and Germany),
available at 2002 WL-NYT 0218100017.
81. See Cienski, supra note 72 (explaining that the issue of state sovereignty
has not gone unnoticed). The Council of Canadians has been highly critical of the
idea of allowing U.S. Customs Service inspectors to conduct inspections in Canada
and has indicated that "[w]e think that this is the thin edge of the wedge .... It's
maybe only a few agents now but how long before they're calling the shots in
Canadian ports'?" Id. See Daniel Leblanc, Canada and U.S. Near Troop Deal:
Soldiers Would be Able to Cross Border if Terrorist Struck, McCallum Says,
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unworkable in the developing world and in the case of less friendly
exporting nations such as China.8 2 It is those countries that are not
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") that would in reality pose the greatest risk.
The imposition of a security screening process would be of little
value unless it was a multilateral comprehensive program with
uniform standards. 3 A partial implementation of the CSI would
GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 28, 2002, at Al (revealing that this "thin edge" argument is
not completely unfounded); John McLaughlin, Greece Snubs US Plea to Inspect
Ships, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, May 4, 2002, at 1 (commenting that the Greek
government has publicly opposed new U.S. anti terrorism initiatives and has flatly
rejected U.S. requests that it be allowed to inspect ships in Greek waters due to
reasons of national sovereignty and constitutional law), available at 2002 WL
21045378. But see Jane Porter, Security Customs Checks Face U.S. Revolution,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, June 27, 2002, at 3 (noting that Customs Commissioner
Robert Bonner has indicated that there has been no opposition to U.S. initiatives
and that "[q]uite the contrary, we have seen a high degree of receptivity"),
available at 2002 WL 21046535.
82. See Julijana Mojsilovic, Nato Bombs Chinese Embassy, GLOBE & MAIL,
May 8, 1999, at Al (indicating that U.S.-Sino relations have been characterized by
a number of unfortunate incidents such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade, the forced landing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane, U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, and the Bush administration's proposed National Missile Defense Plan);
see also Miro Cernetig, China Warns of New Global Arms Race: U.S. Missile-
Defence Plan Threatens World Peace, News Agency Says, GLOBE & MAIL, May 3,
2001, at A12 (explaining that the U.S. missile defense plan further harmed U.S.-
Sino relations); Paul Koring, Bush Blasts China after Spy Crew Released:
President's Blunt Words Signal What May be Tough New Approach to Sino-U.S.
Relations, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 13, 2001, at A10 (stating the negative impact that
Chinese detention of U.S. spy plane crew members had on U.S.-Sino relations);
Paul Koring, China-U.S. Divide Increasing: Bush Calls Defence of Taiwan an
Obligation as Beijing Demands Arms Deal be Cancelled, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 26,
2001, at A14 (stating Beijing's anger at the U.S. plans to defend Taiwan); Greg
Siegle, U.S. Response I.- Asia, Europe Lukewarm to U.S. Cargo Inspection Plan,
GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Jan. 31, 2002 (indicating that many security
analysts question the CSI's success in relation to China, and suggest that even if it
succeeds, the United States will likely have to bear the expense of such a program),
available at http://www.nti.org/dnewswire/issues/2002/1/31/ls.html (last visited
October 20, 2002). But see Porter, supra note 81 (stating that U.S. Customs
Commissioner Richard Bonner has attempted to engage China in the CSI program
and has stated publicly that he is "cautiously optimistic" about such involvement).
However, it is difficult to conceive that the Chinese government would become
fully engaged in such a program in light of diplomatic tensions between the two
states in recent years.
83. See Simons, supra note 80 (noting that the eventual goal of the United
States is to expand the CSI to twenty ports that would "jointly account for 70
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result in secure and non-secure cargo beginning to mix at
transshipment points throughout the world.
U.S. government officials have attempted to portray the creation
of offshore security perimeters as simply a matter of mutual benefit.
As Admiral Loy of the U.S. Coast Guard has suggested, "[t]his goal
is not a question of violating the sovereignty of America's trading
partners. Rather, the idea is to create mutually beneficial layered
defenses 8.... -4 However, if we accept the assertion that sovereignty
involves the right to "exercise... to the exclusion of any other State,
the functions of a State,"85 then the application of U.S. customs
regulations at overseas ports would constitute a prima facie violation
of the sovereignty of other states.
Further, legislation presently before the U.S. Congress would
authorize the Secretary of Transportation to conduct assessments of
foreign ports, identify those that are not up to U.S. standards and
impose sanctions.86 The sanctions can include prohibiting "a United
States or foreign vessel from providing transportation between the
United States and any other foreign port that is served by vessels
navigating to or from a port found not to maintain and carry out
effective security measures."87 This legislation punishes third party
ports and in many senses seeks to impose U.S. maritime security
regulations throughout the world. This may represent an indirect
intrusion into the internal affairs of other states and is contrary to the
U.N. General Assembly resolution on friendly relations, which states
that "[n]o State .... has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reasons whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any
other State .... "88
percent of the 5.7 million containers shipped by sea to the United States"). Even if
the program achieves compliance from the top twenty ports, CSI would still
exclude 1.8 million containers from the screening process. Id.
84. Loy & Ross, supra note 2.
85. Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
86. See Port'and Maritime Security Act 2001, S. 1214, 107th Cong., § 108
(2002).
87. Id. § 108-2503 (a)(3).
88. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
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Many of the other solutions posited to the container problem have
focused on the use of technological advances to reduce the security
risk. One possible solution is the use of x-ray equipment to scan each
container, an application of airport type screening procedures to the
marine sector.89 A recent Canadian Senate Committee Report
endorsed the use of x-ray equipment, stating that the port of
Vancouver now has technology that allows an entire container to be
scanned in approximately one minute. 90 However, in practical terms,
even accepting the premise that a container could be scanned in one
minute, the inspection of the six thousand plus containers on a single
super-Panamax vessel could add over a hundred hours to the loading
process.91 Even using multiple x-ray machines and targeting as little
as ten percent of the cargo on board would produce unacceptable
delays for both shippers and ship owners. Further, the utilization of
screening devices would have to be uniform at all major international
ports. 92
89. See Marc Caputo, Bomb Detector Confuses Sweets With Explosives: Built
For U.S. Airports: New-Style Scan Detected Explosives in Test Runs, NAT'L POST,
June 29, 2002, at A16 (stating that technology-based solutions to security have not
proven overwhelmingly successful in the aviation sector, which raises concerns
about their application in the maritime context). New airport x-ray equipment
based on CT scans have produced a false alarm rate of twenty to thirty percent. Id.
Indications are that this new type of technology has difficulty distinguishing
between explosives and ordinary foodstuffs. Id.
90. See Canadian Senate Report, supra note 1, Part I (13)(B).
91. This calculation assumes that a ship carries 6500 containers and uses one
scanning machine in the inspection process.
92. See Bonner Statement, supra note 74.
The use of such detection technology at our seaports is not enough. The great
international seaports - Rotterdam, Singapore, Hong Kong, among other
places - must also use this equipment to screen for weapons of mass
destruction before they leave those ports. The very survival of the global
shipping economy depends upon this.
Id.; see also The Minister of National Revenue has Announced that the Port of
Halifax Will Receive Three Point Six Million Dollars to Improve its Security,
BROADCAST NEWS, May 15, 2002 (explaining that the Port of Halifax has only
recently sought the technology), available at 2002 WL 21065431; Tom Peters,
Port has Gamma Rays in its Sights, CHRONICLE-HERALD, Mar. 7, 2002, at A5
(revealing that the Port of Vancouver has already spent two million dollars on
gamma ray equipment). The result is different security screening levels on two
different coasts.
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In addition to using scanning equipment, another technology-
dependent solution is the creation of a system of "Maritime Domain
Awareness" ("MDA"), which was originally conceived by the U.S.
Coast Guard.93 MDA utilizes information technology to help
generate timely information on vessels, crews, and cargos.94 Admiral
Loy suggests that the incorporation of commercial information from
manufacturers and shippers could greatly enhance this concept.95
This expanded information network would allow smart decisions
about targeting specific cargo vessels for inspection. He suggests,
Easy access to accurate data on container contents, shippers, consignees,
and even near-real-time container location is what makes just-in-time
systems possible .... The shipping community and supply chain/value
chain managers from commercial sector giants, such as Ford, Walmart,
and General Motors, should be enlisted to keep national and international
distribution networks functioning.
96
This seemingly attractive solution, is premised on a series of
dubious assumptions. The first is that the information shippers and
commercial parties would provide is accurate and that its veracity
could be checked. Second, it assumes that, in the absence of
domestic regulations imposing such a requirement (in their own
countries), foreign companies would willingly provide valuable and
detailed commercial information to U.S. government authorities.
Third, MDA does not appear to take into account transshipment
issues. A manufacturer in Southeast Asia wanting to ship a product
to Central America via a U.S. transshipment port such as Long
Beach may decide that the cost/risk of disclosing commercial
information 97 would not be outweighed by the increased cost of using
93. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, STRATEGIC PLAN 1999, 14 (explaining that
the Maritime Domain Awareness system allows the Coast Guard to more
thoroughly oversee real time vessels), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/overview/strategic.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
94. See id. (asserting that the Maritime Domain Awareness strategy will use
technology to achieve mission requirements).
95. See Loy & Ross, supra note 2 (stating that, information that is produced for
commercial purposes could be used to maximize security).
96. Id.
97. See Grey, supra note 21, at 3 (explaining that the shipping industry is
characterized by extremely high levels of confidentiality).
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an alternate and more expensive non-U.S. port. 98 Finally, information
awareness may in itself prove insufficient. Knowing about a possible
problem and solving it are very distinct issues. MDA would not solve
many of the practical problems discussed earlier such as the
inspection of post-Panamax ships or the potential jurisdictional and
sovereignty issues that may be involved in pre-departure inspections.
Again this solution is not politically or economically realistic
because it requires the imposition of U.S. regulations on other
countries.
As Section V of this paper discusses, any successful maritime
security regime will have to involve international consensus, as well
as take into account issues of commercial secrecy and the
sovereignty of other states. Many of the initial suggestions to solve
maritime security problems have been premised on the imposition of
U.S. regulations abroad or the use of economic coercion to insure
compliance. 99
B. SEAFARERS
Though not as difficult a security problem as the container threat,
seafarers also represent a real security risk. 00  Each year
approximately two hundred thousand foreign mariners arrive in U.S.
98. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen E. Flynn)
(expressing concern that people in the international business will begin to "port
shop" if they deem U.S. ports to be uncompetitive).
99. See U.S. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Robert Quartel)
(arguing that compliance should be "voluntary - not mandatory"). Quartel
concedes that this suggests that "[w]e can't make foreign suppliers abide by all of
the rules, but we can certainly tell their U.S. customers that they may face delays
unless they know their sources and can validate cargo process integrity." Id. The
implication seems to be that none of the participants in U.S. inspection initiatives
will be severely disadvantaged. Delay as a means of insuring compliance suggests
that such a scheme would not be voluntary. Further, the use of delay may in some
cases be more detrimental to the U.S. economy than to foreign economies and
suppliers.
100. See Port and Maritime Security Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House Comm. On
Transportation and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. (2001) (statement of Adm. James
M. Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard) (discussing increased security
measures since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/overview/article-statementloy.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2002).
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ports onboard commercial vessels.'' Just as there is very little
knowledge about the contents of containers, there is equally little
known about the men who operate these vessels.0 2 Any background
checks prior to employment on board a vessel are the legal
responsibility of the flag state of the vessel. 03 One of the great
attractions of "open registries" or "Flags of Convenience" is that they
allow vessel owners to crew the ships with foreign nationals as a
means to control costs. 104 The employment of large numbers of
foreign nationals makes the implementation of enhanced reliability
checks nearly impossible. 05 Thereby, terrorists could operate a
vessel in U.S. waters by obtaining employment with an overseas
shipping company that utilizes Flags of Convenience. 106
The United States has petitioned the IMO to create a verifiable
seafarer identification system to insure that crewmembers "pose no
threat to national security or to the safety and security of maritime
commerce." 07 The proposed system aims to employ biometric
technology such as retinal scans or fingerprints in order to verify the
101. See id. (indicating that movement of unknown persons around U.S. ports
creates a potential security risk).
102: See id. (finding that the differentiation between the movements of lawful
and unlawful persons is imperative in protecting ports).
103. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 94(1) (imposing the obligation that
"[elvery State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag"). This
potentially includes manning requirements and background checks for
crewmembers).
104. RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 11
(1981); see also Anderson, supra note 13, at 158-59 (finding that the use of foreign
labor as a means to. control costs goes back to the mid 1900s and is a key reason
for the proliferation of Flags of Convenience).
105. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 163-65 (noting the "ten reasons why the
observance of safety standards is less stringent amongst open registry states").
106. See id. (discussing safety standards and Flags of Convenience).
107. Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping:
Measures to Improve Maritime Security, U.N. Marit. Safety Comm., 75th Sess.,
Agenda Item 17, at 5, U.N. Doc. MSC/75/17/xx (2002) [hereinafter U.S.
Submission to IMO].
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identities of the crewmembers. 08 Specifically, the United States is
seeking an amendment to Chapter XI of the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS) to ensure that crew members have not
committed a "serious criminal offence," including "murder, assault
with intent to murder, espionage, sedition, treason, rape, kidnapping,
armed robbery, trafficking of drugs or similar offences."' 19 An
effective system of reliability checks must involve a similar system
of background checks for port employees who have access to the
same cargo and facilities as those on the vessels. This may be
problematic in the case of some Western countries such as Canada,
where a large number of port employees have past criminal
convictions." 0  In the United States, the union representing
longshoremen has gone on record as publicly opposing background
checks for port workers."'
108.' See id. at 5-6 (stating that these security devices would help to secure
sensitive areas of U.S. ports).
109. Id. at 6.
110. See Canadian Senate Report, supra note 1, Part I|(B)(1)(C) (stating that a
recent Canadian Senate Committee report on national security found an alarmingly
high rate of personnel with past criminal records). The Committee found that:
At the Port of Montreal... roughly 15 percent of longshoremen and 36
percent of checkers have serious criminal records. At the Port of Halifax,
police told the Committee that 187 of 500 employees (39 percent) whose
records the police checked had serious criminal records. At the Port of
Charlottetown, it was 28 of 51 (54 percent). The Committee is certainly
concerned with the sizable percentage of employees with criminal records.
But it also believes that criminal elements are unlikely to have a zealous
interest in countering terrorist activities, and may knowingly or unknowingly
engage in acts that assist terrorists. Even their relentless efforts to prevent Port
Authorities from exercising control over activities at a port, so that they can
go about their illegal activities, plays into the hands of any would-be terrorists
who might be deterred by a more effective level of supervision.
Id.
111. See John McLaughlin, U.S. Port Unions Plead Don't Demonize Dockers,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb.18, 2002, at 5 (suggesting that legislative attempts to
tighten port security put unwarranted suspicion on U.S. longshoremen while
inadequately dealing with foreign ships and crewmembers), available at 2002 WL
8246069.
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C. SHIP SECURITY
The most obvious security risk comes from the lack of measures
taken to protect the ships themselves." 2 The attack by a small
mooring boat on the destroyer U.S.S. Cole, while docked in the port
of Aden, is evidence of this inability to protect ships."3 The incident
occurred despite the presence of an anti-terrorism force aboard the
ship and demonstrates the vulnerability of even military vessels."
4
Unlike the areas of safety and labor, no security framework forces
ships to comply with an international code in order for ships to be
seaworthy." 5 This means that ship security measures may vary from
vessel to vessel, and that ships may represent vulnerable targets for
terrorists.' 16
At present, there is no requirement that ships have a means to
surreptitiously alert authorities or other vessels that terrorists have
hijacked or attacked the vessel.' '" The United States has petitioned to
have the IMO's Safety of Navigation ("NAy") and Radio-
Communications and Search and Rescue ("COMSAR")
subcommittees study and make recommendations on this matter.""
International regulations do not mandate that a ship have even the
most basic security equipment such as a closed circuit television
112. See U.S. Submission to IMO, supra note 107, at 9 (finding that security
enhancement equipment would help crews' awareness of security threats).
113. See Roberto Suro & Alan Sipress, Navy Revises Initial Account of
Bombing; Cole was Moored, Refueling Before Attack, Officials Say, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 2000, at Al (discussing the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and conflicting
reports of whether the attack could have been prevented).
114. See Michael Fabey, Attack Waiting to Happen, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 23,
2000, at 40 (maintaining that lax port security played a role in the attack).
115. See U.S. Submission to IMO, supra note 107, at 9 (discussing potential
changes to security measures to increase port and ship safety).
116. See id. at 10 (recommending that standard security measures be
implemented on all ships).
117. See id. at 9 (extolling the benefits of an alarm system to notify authorities
and other vessels in the event of a terrorist attack or hijacking).
118. See id. (suggesting alarm systems and tracking devices be used on maritime
vessels).
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system to alert the crew of possible hijacking attempts." 9 Further,
despite emerging security threats, many ship owners oppose the IMO
requirements for the mandatory installation of an Automatic
Identification System ("AIS") on all ships by 2008.120
The United States claims that the need to ensure ship security
through the use of either security equipment or the appointment of a
security officer is a safety issue and falls within the domain of the
SOLAS.' 21 In a recent submission to the IMO, the United States
recommended amendments to Chapter XI of SOLAS pertaining to
"Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security."12 2 However, not
all IMO members support this approach, and Japan and the United
States have disagreed as to whether the International Safety
Management Code ("ISM Code") or SOLAS should incorporate new
requirements for ship security.1 23 Japan and several other states have
argued that the ISM Code is more flexible and suited to the purpose,
whereas the United States has pushed for a more stringent approach
under the SOLAS provisions.
1 24
Although, undoubtedly, counter-terrorism measures can be
brought under the safety ambit, this strategy is arguably
119. See id. (finding that the "[i]nstallation of this basic security equipment on
board ships would help the crew quickly become aware of security threats while
the ship is in port").
120. See Burden Sharing, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, June 19, 2002, at 7 (stating that,
despite the ship owners' argument for a greater focus on training in respect to AIS
and that the land based infrastructure to receive the signals has not been
established, the United States has sought an early implementation of the system),
available at 2002 WL 21046222.
121. See U.S. Submission to IMO, supra note 107, at 4 (suggesting that "a new
Regulation 7 be added to Chapter XI of SOLAS").
122. See id. at 3 (advocating the development of a proper ship security plan to
enable crews to respond appropriately to an attempted terrorist action).
123. See IMO Rift Looms Over U.S. Security Proposals, LLOYDS LIST INT'L,
May 15, 2002, at 2 (outlining the competing arguments for placement of new
security measures), available at 2002 WL21044767.
124. See IMO: What it is, What it Does and How it Works, July 20, 2002
(indicating that codes are recommendations adopted by the IMO Assembly and are
not binding on governments, while conventions are binding on state parties), at
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topicid=325. State parties have
discretion regarding whether or not to incorporate codes in their domestic
legislation. Id.
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misguided. 125 It produces a piecemeal approach in which certain
aspects of maritime terrorism are dealt with by the World Customs
Organization, some by the IMO under SOLAS or the ISM Code, and
still others by means of bilateral arrangements under the CSI. 126 The
implementation of a new comprehensive maritime security
convention would avoid such problems.'27
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTION
In many respects the security problems identified in this paper are
beyond the capacity of a single state to deal with effectively. 28 An
effective system of maritime counter-terrorism requires a
comprehensive multilateral approach.' 29 This type of approach
necessitates not only the involvement of OECD countries, but also
cooperation from exporting countries in the developing world along
with the assistance of states that operate Flags of Convenience. 30
This need for international cooperation raises the questions of
whether states have an international legal obligation to prevent
maritime terrorism and if so, how far that duty extends. '3'
125. See id. (discussing the difficulty in creating binding international
amendments under SOLAS).
126. See id. (noting that security measures involving navigation safety, carriage
of dangerous goods, and nuclear ships are all covered by SOLAS).
127. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (illustrating the bilateral,
piecemeal approach that the United States is using with regard to the CSI program,
and noting that the United States so far favors this approach).
128. See CSIS Speech, supra note 4 (stating that "the United States must work
in partnership with the governments of the countries ... to build a new
international security standard for sea containers"); see also Flynn, supra note 5, at
68 (indicating that a consensus exists amongst both analysts and decision-makers
with respect to the need for international cooperation in combating maritime
terrorism).
129. See Flynn, supra note 5, at 58 (positing that curbing terrorism requires the
collective efforts of the private sector, states, and international bodies).
130. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 164-65 (discussing the lack of stringent
safety standards in developing nations and the difficulty in identifying crew
members).
131. See Report of the Int'l Law Comm., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles] (stating that under
international law, an omission by a state may also be considered a wrongful act).
The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility for
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Customary international law has recognized a duty to prevent
terrorism. In 1934, the League of Nations, in response to possible
Hungarian negligence surrounding the assassination of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia, 3 2 passed a resolution stating that it was
"the duty of every state neither to encourage nor tolerate on its own
territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose."'' 3  The
Resolution indicated that states owed each other a duty of assistance
and that "every State must do all in its power to prevent and repress
acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to
governments which request it.'
' 34
More recently, both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security
Council have consistently emphasized the existence of a positive
duty to prevent terrorism. 35 Past General Assembly resolutions have
called on States "to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that
their respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or
training camps, or for the preparation or organization of acts
intended to be committed against other States or their citizens."'' 36 In
the wake of the September 1lth attacks on the United States, the
U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which reaffirmed
Internationally Wrongful Acts stipulate that an omission by a state attracts liability
under international law by maintaining that:
[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting
of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under the international
law; and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
Id.
132. See JOHN FLOURNOY ALEXANDER, HUNGARY - THE UNWILLING SATELLITE
(1947) (discussing the League of Nation's response to the October 9, 1934,
assassinations of King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Jean-Louis Barthou
while on a visit to France), available at
http://www.hungary.com/corvinus/lib/montgo/montgoO6.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2002). The assassin was a Macedonian revolutionary with links to Croatian
terrorists in Hungary. Id. The' assassination threatened war between Yugoslavia
and Hungary, but the League of Nations was successful in diffusing the conflict.
Id.
133. See 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1759 (1934).
134. Id.
135. See Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 210, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., § 1(3), U.N. Doe. A/Res/51/210 (1997) (calling on states to
adopt measures to prevent terrorism).
136. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 60, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., sec. I (5)(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/60 (1994).
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that each state has a duty to "[c]ooperate, particularly through
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent
and suppress terrorist attacks, and take action against perpetrators of
such acts."' 37 Resolution 1373 specifically requires that states "[t]ake
the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange
of information." 1
38
Arguably, a duty to prevent maritime terrorism is also found in the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities ("Draft
Articles"). 139 The Draft Articles are generally thought of in the
context of transboundary environmental pollution. 14° However, the
scope of the Draft Articles is extremely broad and applies to all
"activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of
causing significant transboundary harm through their physical
consequences."' 4' International law clearly does not prohibit
establishing a large container transshipment facility. 142 However, the
operation of such a facility without appropriate security provisions
could be viewed as being a hazardous activity with the potential to
cause transboundary harm. "41 In many respects, it is analogous to a
state developing a heavy industry without imposing sufficient
environmental controls. 44 The shipping of containers that may
potentially hold nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, without
prior inspection, would obviously constitute a form of transboundary
137. SCOR Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001).
138. Id.
139. See Draft Articles, supra note 131, at 371 (discussing state liability for
failing to prevent unlawful acts).
140. See, e.g., Justin Mellor, The Negative Effects of Chernobyl on International
Environmental Law: The Creation of the Polluter Gets Paid Principle, 17 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 65, 75-76 (1999).
141. Draft Articles, supra note 131, at 371.
142. See id. (discussing the risk of transboundary harm from activities not
prohibited by international law).
143. See id. (defining the term "risk of causing significant transboundary
harm").
144. See id. at 372 (noting that each state must "take all appropriate measures to
prevent significant transboundary harm").
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harm for the receiving state.145 The Draft Articles do not require
states to share a common border for "transboundary harm" to
occur.146 Additionally, the Articles define the term "transboundary
harm" broadly, as harm "caused in the territory... of a State other
than a State of origin," which would appear to encompass harm other
than mere environmental pollution. 14
7
The Draft Articles clearly establish a duty of prevention in that
they obligate the state from which the threat emanates to "take all
appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm."
' 148
The Articles state that this duty includes an obligation to take
legislative action, "including the establishment of suitable
monitoring mechanisms to implement the provisions. ' ' 149 The Draft
Articles further stipulate that there are obligations to consult with
other states in establishing preventative measures, 50 exchange
information on hazards to minimize risk,' and provide notification
in the case of an emergency.'52 Applied in the maritime terrorism
context, these provisions imply a duty on the part of states to
establish appropriate regulations for maritime security, as well as to
share intelligence pertaining to any vessels or shipments that they
may deem to be high risks. 53
145. See id. (discussing appropriate measures for preventing transboundary
harm).
146. See id. (defining the term "transboundary harm").
147. Draft Articles, supra note 131, at 371.
148. Id. at 372.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 373 (stating the requirements for consultations on preventative
measures).
151. Id. at 375 (requiring that states exchange relevant information in a timely
manner).
152. See id. at 376 (maintaining that the state of origin must notify any affected
state expeditiously).
153. See Draft Articles, supra note 131, at 375 (noting that states have the right
to withhold information "vital to national security," but requiring a state to provide
as much information as possible under the circumstances). The Draft Articles
contemplate sharing sensitive information, and this provision implies that states
should share intelligence information pertaining to possible transboundary harm as
a matter of course, unless the state of origin specifically deems it "vital to national
security." Id.
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Several cases in the field of international law point to the fact that
states owe a duty to ensure the safety of foreign nationals and
property.'54 It is possible to argue that the reasoning behind these
cases may be extrapolated to a general duty to prevent terrorism. One
of the most famous of these cases was the Chapman Case, in which
Mexican officials were provided with numerous warnings that
members of the U.S. consulate were in physical jeopardy. Mexican
authorities omitted to take any action with the result that, Chapman a
consulate member, was attacked and shot.'55 The General Claims
Commission (United States and Mexico) awarded Chapman
compensation for the injury and found that:
A warning of imminent danger was communicated to Mexican authorities
in the instant case. One official evidently took note of the warning and
issued suitable instructions to meet the situation. These instructions were
not carried out .... In light of the facts revealed by the record and in
accordance with the applicable principles of law, the Commission is
constrained to sustain the charge of a lack of protection made by the
United States in this case. 156
Though states are not liable for the actions of individual citizens, a
court can hold a state liable for the failure of government officials to
act. "'57 In British Property in Spanish Morocco, arbitrator Huber,
154. See Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman,, State Responsibility for Injuries
to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 232-35 (1977)
(discussing the Jania and Worowski incidents); see also Youmans v. United
Mexican States, (U.S. v. Mex.) 4 R.I.A.A. 110 (1926) (recognizing the general
principle that states have obligations to prevent harm to other states). The U.S.
Supreme Court has observed that, "[t]he law of nations requires every national
government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done within its own
dominion to another nation with which it is at peace or to the people thereof'
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1888).
155. See Chapman v. United Mexican States, (U.S. v. Mex.) 4 R.I.A.A. 632
(1930) (discussing the duty of states to protect aliens and consuls).
156. Id. at 639.
157. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24) (holding that while Iran was not
responsible for the initial acts of Islamic militants in seizing the U.S. embassy in
Tehran, it was responsible for failing to take action to ensure the security of the
U.S. embassy and its staff).
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distinguished between the responsibilities of government officials
and those of individual citizens. 158 He observed that:
[A State] may nevertheless be responsible for what the authorities do or
fail to do in order, as far as possible, to avert the consequences of such
acts. Responsibility for the action or inaction of the public authorities is
quite different from responsibility for acts imputable to individuals
outside the influence of or openly hostile to the authorities ... [Despite
this, the] State is obliged to exercise a certain vigilance...159
Though this case deals with foreign property within the
jurisdiction of a state, its principles may extend to issues surrounding
the prevention of transnational terrorism. Applying its principles to
the container scenario discussed earlier in this paper, one may
suggest that when a State possesses intelligence information or
knowledge of a threat to maritime shipping emanating from its own
territory or even on the high seas, it may be obliged under
international law to take preventative action
1 60
The Corfu Channel case directly supports this analysis. This case
involved a claim by the United Kingdom against Albania for damage
done to British warships by mines within Albania's territorial sea.
161
The International Court of Justice held that:
The obligations incumbent upon Albanian authorities consisted in
notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a
minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching
British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed
them. Such obligations are based.. .on certain general and well
recognized principles namely, even more exacting in peace than in war;
the principle of freedom of maritime communication; and every State's
158. See British Property in Spanish Morocco (Spain v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A. 615
(1925) (observing that, under international law, a state may be held responsible for
the actions or omissions of state authorities).
159. See id. at 642.
160. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing scenarios
involving destructive devices placed in shipping containers).
161. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (1949) (holding that
Albania had a duty to warn foreign ships of the danger of mines in the North Corfu
Strait).
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obligation not to allow [knowingly] its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other states. 1
62
The reasoning of Corfu Channel suggests that states with major hub
ports have an obligation not only to maintain security at the port
facility itself, but also to take reasonable steps to ensure the security
of the contents of the containers that are loaded onboard departing
vessels.
While the incidents discussed earlier deal with local terrorism,
states also have a customary duty to prevent the use of their
territories for the preparation of acts of transnational terrorism. 63 The
1871 Alabama Claims arbitration is one of the older and more
significant rulings in this area. In this case, the United States alleged
that Britain violated the principles of neutrality by allowing the
construction and fitting out of the Confederate ships Alabama and
Florida during the U.S. Civil War. 64 When the United States learned
that the vessels were part of the Confederate fleet and informed
British authorities, the authorities made only perfunctory and
ineffective attempts to arrest the vessels.' 6 The Alabama escaped,
and British vessels eventually fitted out the ship at sea.166 British
authorities also made a similar unsuccessful attempt to detain the
Florida.167 Throughout the Civil War, the Alabama successfully sunk
162. Id. at 51; see also Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911
(1941) (holding that, under the principles of international law, no state has the right
to use its territory in a manner that would cause injury to another state). Albania
was obliged to notify approaching vessels of the imminent danger of the minefield.
Id. This obligation is based on the principles of freedom of maritime
communication and every State's duty not to allow its territory to be used to act
contrary to the rights of other states. Id.
163. See Eric C. Bruggink, The "Alabama" Claims, 57 ALA. LAW. 339, 342
(1996) (discussing the establishment of the principle that a country must exercise
"due diligence" to prevent hostile expeditions from its territory).
164. See id. at 342 (noting that by allowing the construction and fitting out of
Confederate ships during the U.S. Civil War, Britain allegedly violated the
principals of neutrality).
165. See id. at 340-41 (claiming that British Customs authorities failed to
respond to the U.S. ambassador's complaints regarding the British construction of
Confederate ships).
166. Id. at 341.
167. Id.
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a significant number of Union ships, causing the United States to
seek reparations through arbitration at the wars end. 68
The arbitration was based on what became known as the "Three
Rules of Washington," which for the purposes of the arbitration
acted as a standard for the lawfulness of a state's behaviour. 69 The
tribunal found in favour of the United States and held that the British
government had "failed to use due diligence in the performance of its
neutral obligations" pursuant to international law and that the
preventative measures to stop the ships from departing were
insufficient and "so imperfect as to lead to no result."' 170 In the
context of transnational terrorism, the Alabama Claims arbitration
stands for the proposition that "once a government has notice, either
from its own observations or from the complaints it receives from
other states, that its territory is being used for the preparation of
hostile acts, perfunctory efforts to stop these activities will not be
sufficient to meet its duty under international law.''
1
It is clear from customary law that States do owe a duty to each
other to prevent terrorist acts, but this duty extends only as far as a
state's means practically allow. This is an important issue in the case
of "container terrorism," where the cost of purchasing scanning
168. See id. (noting that the United States gave immediate notice to the United
Kingdom of its intention to demand reparations). Interestingly, the CSS Alabama
was commanded by a lawyer from Mobile named Raphael Semmes and after the
eventual sinking of the vessel, Semmes was promoted to Rear Admiral. Following
the war he returned to Mobile and resumed the practice of law. Id. at 341, 343.
169. See Bruggink, supra note 163, at 342 (noting the establishment of the
principle that a country cannot excuse its failure to meet international obligations
through the imposition of its own domestic laws).
A neutral government is bound to use due diligence: (1) to prevent the fitting
out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel, which it has
reasonable grounds to believe is intended ... to carry on war against a power
with which it is at peace; (2) not to permit either belligerent to make use of its
ports or waters as the base of naval operations or for the purpose of
augmenting military supplies or recruiting men; and, (3) to prevent violation
of the foregoing duties.
Id.
170. Lillich & Paxman, supra note 154, at 256-57.
171. Id. at 257.
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equipment and other preventative technology is high.' Even within
OECD countries, the use of such technology is financially
prohibitive and, as a result, ports do not employ it uniformly. For
example, in Canada, the Pacific Coast port of Vancouver obtained
scanning equipment long before the East Coast port of Halifax
obtained funding. 1
73
The duty owed by states in respect to the prevention of terrorism is
not an absolute duty but is one that is defined by the exercise of "due
diligence."'' 74 Limitations on liability may be dictated by things such
as the inability to prevent the attack because of an absence of
manpower in areas of geographical remoteness or by a lack of
information concerning an impending attack. Applied in the
maritime context, where cargo inspection is extremely difficult and
costly, these limitations on state responsibility appear to create a
wide exemption.
A possible solution to the restriction of state responsibility is to
establish uniform international standards for maritime security.
However, as Section V of this paper points out, the creation and
implementation of specific standards for security measures on an
international scale would be very difficult. As aviation security
indicates, past attempts to achieve consensus on international
security standards to prevent terrorism have proven largely
unsuccessful. '71
172. See Peters, supra note 92, at A5 (noting the two million dollar price tag for
a gamma ray machine purchased by the port of Vancouver).
173. Id.; compare id. with The Minister of National Revenue has Announced that
the Port of Halifax will Receive Three Point Six Million Dollars, BROADCAST
NEWS, May 15, 2002 (showing the significant cost of specialized equipment and
the time it takes certain ports to acquire it), available at 2002 WL 21065431.
174. See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 154, at 258 (stating that the Alabama
Claims' due diligence analysis can serve as a starting point for state responsibility
vis-a-vis matters of terrorism).
175. See Sharon A. Williams, International Law and Terrorism: Age-Old
Problems, Different Targets, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 87, 99-100 (1988) (noting the
difficulty of achieving consensus on international security standards to prevent
terrorism). The difficulty was apparent in the drafting of the 1988 Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation.
See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Jan. 26, 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
Article 10(1) of the Convention called upon parties to take all practicable measures
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III.EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
As Section II discusses, the movement of vessels, cargo, and
crews poses a considerable security risk.'76 Arriving at practical
solutions that do not impede the flow of goods and restrict
international economic growth is extremely difficult. In addition to
the practical problems associated with preventing maritime terrorism
there are legal difficulties, due in part to the inadequacy of existing
international instruments.
Over the past forty years, regional and international conventions
that seek to suppress or prevent terrorism have proliferated.'77
to prevent aviation crimes. During the negotiations, the USSR suggested that a
requirement be added for trained inspectors and the establishment of a prohibition
of unauthorized access in controlled zones within airports. However, difficulties
associated with defining "controlled zones" led to the rejection of this suggestion.
Williams, supra, at 99-100.
176. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (outlining the various
sources of vulnerability).
177. See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On
Board Aircraft, Dec. 4, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Montreal
Convention, supra note 175; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, Feb. 23, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. No.
100-19, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 627; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, June 3, 1983, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 251; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (1999);
Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb.
2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S. 195, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-49.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002);
European Convention on the Suppression, of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1979
U.N.T.S. 94, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/090.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2002); South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 44h Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/136 (1989)
available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv l8.pdf (last visited Nov.
4, 2002); Convention on the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating
International Terrorism, available at http://www.oic-un.org/26icfm/c.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002). At present, no comprehensive international convention on
terrorism exists. The United States has consistently opposed a comprehensive
approach because the piecemeal approach allows it to draw on a wide range of
disparate legal norms. However, one commentator has suggested that the U.S.
opposition to such a move stems from the fact that "an effective multilateral
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Several international law conventions could play an important role in
the prevention of terrorism at sea, including the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas, UNCLOS, and the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation." 8 However, these instruments are largely inadequate
with respect to prevention because they have either attempted to fit
terrorism' within the historical ambit of piracy or they have focused
on the issue of exertion of jurisdiction following an attack.
A. THE 1958 GENEVA CONVENTION AND UNCLOS
Considerable debate exists amongst commentators as to whether
maritime terrorism falls within the meaning of "piracy" under
existing international conventions and customary law.'79 Piracy, like
war crimes and slave trafficking, is an area of universal jurisdiction,
which means that all nations have the right to prosecute the offense
regardless of where it takes place. 80 Though it is highly debatable
scheme .. . would presumably restrict its unfettered political power to act
unilaterally." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 92 (2002).
178. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention] available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/hseas.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2002); UNCLOS,
supra note 13, art. 101; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, March 10, 1988, available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-conventionmaritime-navigation.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002).
179. See Gregory V. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The
Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158, 159 (1987)
(debating whether the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro falls into the definition
of piracy, as defined by the 1958 Geneva Convention); see also George R.
Constantinople, Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achillo Lauro Incident,
26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723, 748 (1986) (discussing the drafting of a more
contemporary definition of piracy); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New "Jamaica
Discipline: " Problems with Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 141-47 (1990) (commenting on the
"private ends" controversy and the "one ship/two ship" controversy stemming
from the definition of piracy in UNCLOS).
180. See Jeffrey Allan McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against
Terrorism: The United States Response to Achille Lauro-Questions of Jurisdiction
and its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 439 (1986) (listing crimes
subject to jurisdiction under the universality principle); see also TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997) (stating
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whether terrorism constitutes a crime of universal jurisdiction, the
tendency is to include it within the ambit of piracy for legal
purposes.81 Despite the dramatic rise in terrorism throughout the
1960s and 1970s, UNCLOS made no special provision for terrorism;
instead the state parties chose to adopt the definitions of piracy
contained in the 1958 Geneva Convention.8 2
Maritime terrorism does not fall comfortably within the legal
meaning of piracy. As the technology available to terrorists and
patterns of maritime commerce evolve, it is increasingly
inappropriate to refer to maritime terrorism as a form of piracy. In
1958, at the conclusion of the Geneva Convention, it was not
possible to conceive of multimodal systems, post-Panamax ships, or
the general increase in global trade. As time progresses, the nature of
threats change. As a result, to continue to define terrorism as piracy
is to create a new legal fiction.
An examination of the inadequacies of the definition of piracy
contained in Article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
(Article 101 of UNCLOS) confirms this analysis. The article
establishes four basic criteria for an act to be considered piratical.
These include an illegal act of violence, detention or depredation
committed by the crew or passengers for private ends committed on
the high seas against another vessel.'83 The 1958 Convention on the
that states may exert universal jurisdiction over erga omnes offenses, i.e., offenses
harming both the person to whom they are directed and the general international
community). Higgins goes on to note that though the category of universal
jurisdiction generally includes piracy, it does not include terrorism. Id.
181. See id. at 28 (observing that while some terrorist acts, including "certain
major offenses against persons protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions" give
rise to universal jurisdiction, the hijacking of aircraft does not).
182. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 178, art. 15; UNCLOS, supra
note 13, art. 101. Articles 14-21 of the 1958 Geneva Convention are nearly
identical to articles 100-07 of UNCLOS. In particular, the definition of piracy
contained in article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention became article 101 in
UNCLOS. Menefee argues that the piracy articles in UNCLOS "perpetuate defects
in response to maritime violence." Menefee, supra note 179, at 128. See id. at 141
(suggesting that UNCLOS, like the 1958 Geneva Convention, has several thematic
shortcomings, including the definition of piracy).
183. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 178, art. 15. Article 15 of 1958
Geneva Convention states:
Piracy consists at any of the following acts:
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High Seas adopted the definition of piracy from the International
Law Commission's ("ILC") report to the U.N. General Assembly.
8 4
The ILC specifically excluded acts committed on board a vessel by
the crew or passengers and directed against the vessel itself, or
against the persons or property on the vessel.'85 The requirements
that an offence involve two vessels and that an act must be for
private ends excludes a large number of modem terrorist acts. The
hypothetical situation posited in Section I of this paper, involving the
shipping of a container holding a nuclear, biological, or chemical
device for the purposes of destroying or disrupting a major
international port likely falls outside its meaning; neither the private
ends requirement nor the two ship requirement would be met.
The "private ends" issue is also a source of considerable debate
amongst commentators in that it appears to exclude acts committed
by political insurgents.'86 The ILC rapporteur to the General
Assembly in 1955 took a narrow view of the definition of piracy,
stating:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against person or
property on board such a ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act .described in sub-
paragraph I or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
Id. art 15.
184. Report of the International Law Commission.: Regime of the High Seas and
of the Territorial Sea, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 20 (1955).
185. Id. at 65.
186. See Malvina Hallberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro,
Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 277-
79 (1988) (explaining that commentators cannot unequivocally determine the
meaning of the term "private ends" as used in the 1958 Convention); see also
Menefee, supra note 179, at 142-43 (discussing whether the piracy, as confined to
"private ends," excludes all political seizures). Menefee notes that an act may have
both private and political ends; additionally, though a perpetrator may deem an act
to be political, it is not necessarily so. Id. at 143.
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Although States at times have claimed the right to treat as pirates
unrecognized insurgents against a foreign government who have
pretended to exercise belligerent rights on the sea against neutral
commerce, or privateers whose commissions violated the announced
policy of the captor, and although there is authority for subjecting some
cases of these types to the common jurisdiction of all States, it seems best
to confine the common jurisdiction to offenders acting for private ends
only.'
87
However, this private ends requirement did not stop the United
States from characterising the Palestinian terrorists' seizure of the
Achille Lauro as a form of piracy.88
The one ship-two ship debate has been as equally controversial
among commentators. 89 The 1958 High Seas Convention and the
1982 UNCLOS 'do not appear applicable to a situation where the
crew or passengers seize control of the ship.19 This would exclude a
potential maritime version of the September 11, 2001, aviation
attacks, where terrorists already on board a vessel seize control of a
ship and attempt to the use the ship itself as weapon against other
ships at sea or against port facilities. However, the 1958 Convention
does apply if the internal seizure of a vessel involves a government
ship. 191 Article 16 specifically states that "acts of piracy...
committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft
whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are
187. See Summary Records of the 290th Meeting [1955], 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 37, 41, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/79.
188. See Documents Concerning the Achille Lauro Affair and Cooperation in
Combating International Terrorism, 24 I.L.M. 1509, 1554-57 (1985)
(demonstrating that the U.S. Justice Department obtained warrants for the arrest of
the Achille Lauro terrorists for "piracy on the high seas").
189. Menefee, supra note 179, at 144-47 (discussing the one ship-two ship
controversy and related jurisdictional issues).
190. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 178, art. 15 (defining piracy as
"any illegal acts of violence ... committed ... by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship ... and directed ... against another ship or aircraft"); UNCLOS,
supra note 13, art. 101 (stating that piracy consists of an act of violence or
detention by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft directed
against another ship or aircraft).
191. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 102 (declaring that acts of piracy
committed by a government ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a
private ship or aircraft).
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assimilated to acts committed by a private ship."' 92 As one critic has
pointed out, this distinction suggests that internal seizures of non-
government vessels for political ends are non-piratical, whereas the
seizure of government vessels by crew or passengers in contrast
would qualify as a form of piracy. 193
Samuel Menefee has argued that if the 1982 UNCLOS is read
closely there is in fact no "two ship requirement."'' 94 He argues,
Article 101(a)(ii) states that the crime be against 'a ship, aircraft, persons
or property' (there is no mention of "another") if the location is 'outside
the jurisdiction of any State.' The high seas is unarguably such a place.
Therefore, the requirement of the presence of two vessels for a piracy to
occur is unnecessary. 1
95
Though this argument has some merit, it forces international law to
fit the changed reality of maritime commerce and international
terrorism.
There is very little in the way of provisions in either Convention
that would assist in preventing a maritime terrorist attack. However,
the 1958 and 1982 Conventions do contain provisions that create a
"right of visit" for foreign warships that encounter a vessel on the
high seas if the warship has reasonable grounds to suspect that it may
be engaged in piracy. 96 Provided that maritime terrorism falls within
192. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 177, art 16.
193. See McCredie, supra note 180, at 448-49 (explaining the different
responses that states may make to seizure of a vessel depending on whether a
vessel is taken internally or externally). Under the 1958 Geneva Convention, only
the seized ship's flag state can pursue a vessel if it is taken internally. Id. at 448.
However, all nations may pursue a ship that is captured by another ship. Id.
194. See Samuel Menefee, Anti-Piracy law in the Year of the Ocean: Problems
and Opportunity, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 312-13 (1999) (countering the
generally accepted reading of UNCLOS as to exclude from the concept of piracy
crew seizures or passenger takeovers).
195. Id. at 312 (noting that though Article 101 of UNCLOS states that a piracy
crime must be against a ship, the article does not explicitly state that the crime be
against "another" ship).
196. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 110 (1). Art. 101 (1) reads:
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship
entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not
justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
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the ambit of piracy, this provision would allow countries such as the
United States to conduct searches of suspect vessels at sea before
they enter U.S. territorial waters. However, the "reasonable grounds"
requirement appears to rule out the conducting of random inspections
or engaging in a type of comprehensive maritime security screening
process prior to entry into U.S. waters. Further, Article 110(3) of
UNCLOS provides that "[i]f the suspicions prove to be unfounded,
and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act
justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that
may have been sustained."'97 This provision makes wrongful
inspections a very costly procedure for the country invoking the
"right of visit." The compensation is payable to the owner of the
vessel and not to the state, which seems to rule out the possibility
that bilateral agreements between states could contract out of the
compensation requirements.
The 1958 Convention and UNCLOS neither envision the need for
the type of comprehensive structure or multilateral approach to
control maritime terrorism required in the aftermath of September
11, 2001, nor facilitate preventive measures. The only reference that
indicates or even hints at a multilateral approach to the problem is
Article 14 of the Geneva Convention. 98 It obligates states to
"cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on
the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State."' 19 9 This provision is inadequate with respect to cooperation
because it does not account for the fact that a terrorist act may
involve multiple perpetrators, both on the high seas and within
several national jurisdictions. Both the 1958 Geneva Convention and
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the
warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
Id.
197. Id. art. 110 (3).
198. See 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 178, art. 14.
199. Id.
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UNCLOS approach the topic in a manner that evokes historical
conceptions of piracy. 2°° This serves merely to obfuscate the modem
reality of violence at sea.2°'
B. CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION
As the previous section of this paper has shown, existing
international law on maritime terrorism is conceptually outdated and
lacking in several key aspects.0 2 In 1986, in response to the
hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, and partly in response to
existing legal inadequacies, Egypt, Austria, and Italy proposed the
creation of a new convention to specifically deal with the issue of
maritime terrorism.2 3 As a result of this initiative, in June 1987, the
Council of the IMO at its fifty-eighth session "decided to convene a
conference on the suppression of maritime terrorism, using as the
basis of its work a draft text prepared by an earlier Ad Hoc
Preparatory Committee. 2 °4 The final result of these negotiations was
the creation of the 1988 IMO Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
200. See Menefee, supra note 194, at 315 (emphasizing that historical notions of
piracy obscure attempts to address modem-day piratical crimes). Menefee points
out that,
The marine criminal researcher is often put in a 'Catch-22' situation 'piaying
up' the skull-and-bones, Blackbeard, walking-the-plank aspect of the problem
appears the only way to attract attention, but the media then inexplicably
concentrates on this to the exclusion of anything else. By overemphasizing




202. See supra notes 179-201 and accompanying text (discussing current
maritime law addressing piracy and other outdated concepts).
203. I.M.O., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL
ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION iii (1988).
204. See Phillip E. Fried, International Agreements-Convention and Protocol
from the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 226, 227 (1989) (discussing
the creation of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts the Safety of
Maritime Navigation and discussing its ambiguities).
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This new Convention represented a great improvement over
existing international law in the sense that it moved away from some
of the problems associated with piracy, such as the "private ends"
and the "one ship-two ship" debates. The Convention simplified
many of the issues surrounding both offenses and jurisdiction.
Article 3(1) of the Convention clearly articulates six different types
of offences that are covered, including the placing "or causing to be
placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance
which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or
its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation
of the ship."2 °5 This provision clearly makes it an offence to use a
container in the manner described in section two of this paper.
In addition to defining offenses, the SUA Convention also focuses
on the exertion of jurisdiction after the fact. The Convention
establishes three grounds for mandatory jurisdiction and three for
permissive jurisdiction over an offender.20 6 Ultimately, states have a
positive obligation to either prosecute terrorists or extradite them for
violations of the Convention.20 7 In many respects, the Convention
205. SUA, supra note 11, art. 1(d).
206. Id. art. 6(1)-(2). Art. 6 reads:
Each State Party shall take measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is
committed:
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the
offence is
committed; or
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or
(c) by a national of that State.
A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that
State; or (b) during its commission a national of that State is seized,
threatened, injured or killed; or (c) it is committed in an attempt to compel
that State to do or abstain from doing any act.
Id.
207. Id. art. 10. Article 10 reads:
The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is
found shall, in cases to which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite him be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case without delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance
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constituted a response to the shrinking universal jurisdiction brought
about by UNCLOS. This shrinking of the high seas increased
opportunities for terrorists to conduct activities within the
jurisdiction of states sympathetic to their causes.
The Convention is problematic in that it is reactive, as opposed to
preventative, in nature. It offers little guidance for the creation of a
regime to prevent terrorism on the high seas or within the territorial
waters of states. The Convention largely relegates prevention issues
to the preamble; the preamble calls on the IMO to develop measures
"to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships" and it
affirms "the desirability of monitoring rules and standards relating to
the prevention and control of unlawful acts against ships and persons
on board ships, with a view to updating them as necessary."208
However, in the years since the signing of the Convention, there has
been no significant action relating to ship security; rather, the IMO
has focused more on its traditional role of promoting safety at sea
and preventing maritime pollution.
Even those substantive provisions in the SUA Convention aimed
at prevention, such as those dealing with cooperation and
communication of relevant information to other state parties, are
vague and highly permissive. Article 13 establishes a general duty of
states to prevent the use of their territories as bases for possible
attacks and requires states to exchange information. 0 9 Article 14
defines the information requirements. It states that a party that has:
with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the
law of that State.
Id.
208. Id. prmbl.
209. Id. art. 13. Article 13 reads:
(1) States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in
article 3, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective
territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their
territories;
(b) exchanging information in accordance with their national law, and co-
ordinating administrative and other measures taken as appropriate to prevent
the commission of offences set forth in article 3.
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reason to believe that an offense set forth in article 3 will be committed
shall, in accordance with its national law, furnish as promptly as possible
any relevant information in its possession to those States which it believes
would be the States having established jurisdiction in accordance with
article 6.210
These provisions pose several problems. First, they restrict the flow
of information about possible attacks to only those states that may
exert jurisdiction, despite the fact that any act involving maritime
shipping would likely have implications for a multitude of third-
party states. Second, Article 15 requires reporting to the Secretary
General any action taken pursuant to the Convention, such as a
prosecution; the Secretary General then transmits it to all other states
parties.2" Unless the Secretary General establishes an efficient
information clearinghouse with proper procedures, this requirement
may slow down the transmission of valuable information by creating
an unnecessary intermediary.
(2) When, due to the commission of an offence set forth in article 3, the
passage of a ship has been delayed or interrupted, any State Party in whose
territory the ship or passengers or crew are present shall be bound to exercise
all possible efforts to avoid a ship, its passengers, crew or cargo being unduly
detained or delayed.
Id.
210. SUA, supra note 11, art. 14.
211. Id. art. 15. Article 15 reads:
(1) Each State Party shall, in accordance with its national law, provide to the
Secretary-General as promptly as possible, any relevant information in its
possession concerning:
(a) the circumstances of the offence;
(b) the action taken pursuant to article 13, paragraph 2;
(c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged offender, and,
in particular, the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal
proceedings.
(2) The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in
accordance with its national law, communicate the final outcome of the
proceedings to the Secretary-General.
(3) The information transmitted in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall
be communicated by the Secretary-General to all States Parties, to members
of the International Maritime Organization ... to the other States concerned,
and to the appropriate international inter-governmental organizations.
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The third problem is that the passing of information must follow
the national law of the state who possesses the information.212 Given
the classified nature of information on terrorism and the existence of
onerous official secrets acts,21 3 information might not always be
timely and forthcoming. The final problem with the Convention is
that it only requires the transmission of information when there is
suspicion of a likely attack, not as a matter of regular course.21 4 The
U.S. Coast Guard's concept of Maritime Domain Awareness,
described in section II of this paper, involves the sharing of
commercial and military intelligence on shipping that goes far
beyond what the Convention conceives of as information sharing.
The Convention is largely inadequate when dealing with the threat
posed by container vessels in the post September 11 security
environment. As one commentator suggested after the Convention
was opened for signature, "though the Convention represents a
commitment to the prevention of unlawful acts, it is ultimately up to
the signatory states themselves to make the treaty work, and it
remains to be seen how states will apply the Convention in the
absence of an enforcement mechanism." ' 5 In the years since the
Convention's conclusion, states have accomplished very little in this
area, suggesting the need for a new multilateral mechanism aimed
squarely at prevention.
IV.TOWARD ANEW MARITIME SECURITY
REGIME
As the previous section discussed, there are severe inadequacies in
existing international law dealing with maritime terrorism. The
212. Id. art. 13(l)(b) (stating that States must cooperate by "exchanging
information in accordance with the [states parties] national law, and co-ordinating
administrative and other measures taken as appropriate to prevent the commission
of the offenses set forth in article 3").
213. See, e.g., Official Secrets Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 0-5, s.3(4) (illustrating that
most states have some form of official secrets act that criminalizes the passing of
information to a foreign power, except where it is explicitly approved).
214. SUA, supra note 11, art. 14 (explaining that a state party is only required to
transmit when it has "reason to believe that an offense set forth in article 3 will be
committed").
215. Fried, supra note 204, at 235.
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problem is complex and involves a wide range of parties such as
port, flag, and coastal states along with shippers and manufacturers.
The complexity of the problem dictates that any new approach would
require international cooperation. This section examines some
possible options for dealing with the problem.
One of the most obvious solutions to the problem of maritime
terrorism is the establishment of regional anti-terrorism
conventions.216 This could entail creating uniform standards for
inspection of ships and cargo, the sharing of intelligence information
among port states, and reciprocal enforcement and inspection rights
in one another's maritime zones. However, a proposal of this nature
would undoubtedly involve states derogating a certain amount of
national sovereignty and could contravene some sections of
UNCLOS.217 Despite this, UNCLOS may in fact permit this type of
agreement between states. Article 311(3) allows for "[t]wo or more
State Parties [to] conclude agreements modifying or suspending the
216. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Maritime Terror in Europe and the
Mediterranean, 12 MARINE POLICY 143, 151 (1988) (advocating a regional
approach to terrorism and piracy based on case studies involving Europe and the
Mediterranean); see also Menefee, supra note 179, at 149 (suggesting that regional
organizations could coordinate efforts to fight maritime crime). Regional
approaches to terrorism so far have been of a very general nature and have set
down the principles of law rather than creating an operational mechanism for
counter terrorist initiatives; see, e.g., OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion
that Are of International Significance, 2 Feb. 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S.
195, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-49.html (last
visited Nov. 21, 2002). SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/136 (1989), available at
http://untreaty.org/Terrorism/Conv l8.pdf.
217. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 2 (establishing that the coastal state has
sovereignty over the adjacent territorial sea to the exclusion of all other states). A
regional solution may compromise this to some extent. Article 2 of UNCLOS
states:
(1) The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
(2) This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as
to its bed and subsoil.
(3) The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this
Convention and to other rules of international law.
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operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the
relations between them." ' The state parties, in making such an
agreement, cannot derogate from the basic principles of the
Convention. While Article 311(3) may suggest that side bar
agreements to UNCLOS must be limited, one commentator has
suggested that "there is an alternative argument that it opens the way
for interested parties to rectify the flaws found in the treaty's
treatment of piracy. "219
The regional approach to controlling terrorism would be similar to
the attempts by the United States and Caribbean states to control
drug trafficking. In the past fifteen years, the United States has
entered into "ship rider agreements" with several states. 20 These
agreements give the U.S. Coast Guard extensive rights to conduct
interdiction operations including boarding and searching vessels
within other states' territorial waters, provided that a member of that
coastal state's defense force is onboard the U.S. vessel. The most far
reaching of these agreements allows for the U.S. Coast Guard to
"board foreign flag vessels, and place the people on board another
country's ships; pursue suspect vessels into another country's
territorial sea; and detain suspect vessels other than those bearing a
signatory's flag and order suspect planes to land there."22'
There are several problems with this type of regional approach.
The first is that for political reasons not all states are comfortable
with a derogation of even limited aspects of their sovereignty within
their own territorial waters, or for that matter allowing another state
218. Id. art. 311(3).
219. Menefee, supra note 179, at 149.
220. See Laleta Davis-Mattis, International Drug Trafficking and the Law of the
Sea: Outstanding Issues and Bilateral Responses with Emphasis on U.S.-
Caribbean Agreements, in 15 OCEAN Y.B. 360, 280-85 (Elisabeth Mann Borgese,
et al. eds., 2000) (discussing "ship rider agreements" concluded between the
United States and Caribbean states that cover counter drug operations against
private and commercial vessels other than those of the parties to the agreements).
221. Davis-Mattis, supra note 220, at 381-382. See generally Kathy-Ann
Brown, The Ship Rider Model: An Analysis of the U.S. Proposed Agreement
Concerning Maritime Counter Drug Operations in Its Wider Legal Context, in
CONTEMPORARY CARIBBEAN LEGAL ISSUES (Andrew Burgess ed., 1997)
(analyzing the U.S. proposed ship-rider agreement by examining other cooperative
agreements between states to stop the flow of illicit drug traffic on the seas).
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to exert jurisdiction on the high seas over ships flying their flag.
Arguably, the ship rider agreements are successful in part because
U.S. relations with many Caribbean states tends to be of a patron-
client nature, which makes the derogation of sovereignty less of an
issue then with some other nations. The second problem is that
undertaking a regional approach to maritime terrorism may in fact
prove an inadequate response to the problem. As section II of this
paper demonstrates, 222 modem security threats are global and not just
regional in nature. Due to large transshipment facilities, threats may
emerge from any comer of the globe, which implies that a new
regime must not limit itself to a single geographical area. The scope
of today's threat extends beyond that comprehended by
commentators writing as recently as ten years ago. Samuel Menefee
suggested in 1990 that "[r]egional Conventions could.. .be
established, corresponding with the discrete crime clusters which
exist in contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. Involved
coastal states and affected flag states could agree on a finely tuned
approach to each problem, taking into account local conditions. 223
Menefee's solution invokes a narrow conception of the problem and
would be of limited value in today's security environment.
A better solution to dealing with the new threats associated with
maritime terrorism may lie in the creation of a new multilateral
mechanism applying a type of the port state control approach. Port
state control arose in response to a series of bad maritime accidents
such as the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967224 and from a growing
concern over the proliferation of unsafe shipping that utilized Flags
of Convenience or open registries.225 States in the 1950s and 1960s
perceived Flags of Convenience as nothing other than "unethical
222. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of
"megaports" and noting the impact of an attack on trade).
223. Menefee, supra note 179, at 149.
224. See CRISPIN GILL ET AL., THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON XX (1967)
(providing a detailed account of the large tanker accident involving the Torrey
Canyon, which ran aground off the coast of the United Kingdom, spilling 120,000
tons of oil into the English Channel, and which served as a catalyst for the 1973
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships).
225. See John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine To Cure A Sick
Industry, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 571, 575 (1997) (describing the role of
international organizations in developing port state control measures).
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legal fictions designed to escape the safety controls, social
legislation, taxation, and maritime policies required by other
nations." '226 The creation of port state control regimes granted
national maritime authorities the power under either an international
convention or under domestic legislation to board, inspect, and
possibly detain merchant ships that fly a foreign flag. 27 The goal of
port state control programmes is to drive sub-standard shipping out
of the commercial marketplace through costly detentions for not
complying with international regulations.
Just as existing port state control focuses upon safety and
environmental concerns, a similar regime aimed strictly at ensuring
maritime security could also be created. The system could require
that vessels meet certain international standards for security of crew,
goods, and vessels. These security standards would have to be first
set out in a maritime security convention that would then be enforced
using Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)s similar to the Paris
and Tokyo MOUs for port state control. A failure of a vessel to
comply with security regulations would result in the vessel not being
allowed to depart and, in some cases, future access to the port could
even be denied. Any refusal by a vessel to provide information on
cargo being carried or the employment of crewmembers 'that have
not undergone an enhanced reliability check could result in the
detention of the ship
Recent proposals that deal with the issue of maritime terrorism
have principally focused on the role of the IMO in setting standards
for prevention. In November 2001, the IMO agreed to convene a
December 2002 Conference on Maritime Security in order to adopt
226. Carlisle, supra note 104, at 152.
227. See Hare, supra note 225, at 571 (explaining that the purpose of port state
control is to ensure that ships comply with applicable international and domestic
safety requirements). There are presently several different port state control
regimes. These are established pursuant to a series of regional MOU's such as the
Paris, Tokyo, and Vin del Mar MOUs. Id. at 577-583; see also Memorandum of
Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime
Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. I (coordinating the port state control mechanisms of the maritime
authorities of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, and the Russian Federation (since 1996) and cooperating
authorities such as the U.S. Coast Guard).
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new or amended regulations with respect to maritime security.228
Though certain aspects of a new security regime may fit within
existing safety, security, and port state mechanisms administered by
the IMO, it would be beneficial to create a new regime with a
significant non-maritime component. Historically, the -IMO has
principally focused on maritime safety and pollution, as opposed to
security matters. 229 A new security regime may involve not just
existing national maritime authorities, but also security and customs
organizations and could be organized in conjunction with the World
Customs Organization 230 In this sense, a new regime would extend
beyond simply focusing on the maritime aspects of terrorism. To a
limited degree, the United States has recognized this requirement in
its submissions to the IMO, stating that the responsibility for
maritime security "extends beyond IMO's purview of the maritime
world into land-based sources. To properly address this issue, other
228. See International Maritime Organization, Newsroom, Maritime Security
(explaining that the purpose of the Conference on Maritime Security in December
2002 is to adopt new regulations to enhance ship and port security, as well as to
prevent the shipping trade from becoming a target of international terrorism), at
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topicid=582&docid= 1821 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2002).
229. See International Maritime Organization, Objectives of the Organization in
the 2000s, Resolution A.900 (21) (explaining that the central focus of the IMO has
been the implementation of safety and pollution instruments such as the SOLAS
and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), and that it has only recently
turned its attention toward terrorism), available at
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topicid=311 (last visited Oct. 16.
2002); see also Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 48, art. 1 (setting forth the purposes of
the organization).
230. See WorldCustoms Organization, Convention Establishing a Customs Co-
operation Council, Dec. 15, 1950, Prmbl. (noting that the purpose of the Customs
Co-operation Council created by the convention was to secure "the highest degree
of harmony and uniformity in their Customs systems), available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Conventions/convccc.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2002). It is logical that the World Customs Organization play a lead role in the
establishment of a new international security system for maritime trade, as it is the
only intergovernmental organization that has competence in customs matters. The
U.S. C.S.I initiative is premised on the principle of customs cooperation and, to
prove successful, it would require a comprehensive and global approach.
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stakeholders need to be appropriately engaged to develop effective
overall security measures. ' '231
A new security regime for combating terrorism that blacklists or
bans ships considered a security risk from ports raises important
issues concerning flag discrimination and the legal right of states to
close their ports to foreign vessels. The 1923 Geneva Convention
and International Regime of Maritime Ports2 32 points to a principle of
free access to ports. 33 However, this Convention has a limited
number of signatories23 4 and in all likelihood is not representative of
existing customary law. A 1975 study by UNCTAD dismissed the
Convention's value in this respect. The report stated:
It would appear that the 1923 Ports Convention does not state
unequivocally (i) that a right of access exists for all merchant ships that
come to a port with a lawful purpose, regardless of their nationality or
ownership and prior or subsequent port of call; (ii) the type of ports for
which access is granted; (iii) the type of vessels for which access is
231. U.S. Submission to IMO, supra note 107, at 8; see also Convention on the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, supra note 231, art. 1(b)
(stating that one of the organization's purposes is "to encourage the removal of
discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by Governments affecting
shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote the availability of
shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination"). The IMO
may also be an inappropriate body to implement a new security scheme because
any new initiative will inevitably involve some level of targeting or discrimination
against shipping originating from particular states.
232. Convention and Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports,
Dec. 9, 1923, 58 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Ports Convention].
233. See id. art. 2. Article 2 states:
[E]very Contracting State undertakes to grant the vessels of every other
Contracting State equality of treatment with its own vessels, or those of any
other State whatsoever, in the maritime ports situated under its sovereignty or
authority, as regards freedom of access to the port, the use of the port, and the
full enjoyment of the benefits as regards navigation and commercial
operations which it affords to vessels, their cargoes and passengers.
Id.
234. See id. at 289 (listing parties to the Convention and indicating that neither
the United States or Russia signed the Convention, and many of the important
maritime states have ignored it).
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granted; (iv) the circumstances in which access can be denied; and (v) the
procedures governing access.
235
The 1923 Ports Convention also contains a security exemption to
the "equality of treatment" provisions that may allow discriminatory
port practices if they are based on national security concerns. Article
17 of the annexed statute allows each contracting state "to take the
necessary precautionary measures in respect of the transport of
dangerous goods or goods of a similar character, as well as general
police measures, including the control of emigrants entering or
leaving its territory 2 36 provided they do not result in discrimination
contrary to the principles of the statute.
In addition to the somewhat limited support for free access
contained in the 1923 Ports Convention, the principle is also
supported by obiter from the arbitration decision in Saudi Arabia v.
Aramco.237 In this case, the arbitrator commented that "[a]ccording to
a great principle of public international law, the ports of every State
must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed
when the vital interests of the State so require. '238 However, in
respect to the arbitration, it can certainly be argued that the "vital
interests of a State" would comprise the need to keep its territory free
of the threat of terrorist attack. 239
The legal evidence supporting a right of access to another state's
ports is tentative at best. 240 The right to close one's ports to foreign
vessels is a natural corollary to the principle of state sovereignty. As
235. UNCTAD, Economic Co-operation in Merchant Shipping, Treatment of
Foreign Merchant Vessels in Ports, UN Doc. TD/Bc.4/136 (1975).
236. Ports Convention, supra note 232, art. 17.
237. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib.
1958).
238. Id. at 212.
239. See 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1950) (illustrating that in times of national
emergency, U.S. domestic legislation allows the President to make an Executive
Order that regulates the anchorage and movement of vessels).
240. See, e.g., Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafareer's Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1960) (showing U.S. courts' rejection of the right of access to ports principle).
See generally Louise de La Fayette, Access to Ports in International Law, 11 INT'L
J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 7 (1996) (discussing the U.S. view that "it has
complete authority to grant or to deny access to its ports").
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one commentator has observed, "limitations to sovereignty cannot be
presumed and there is no evidence of any limitations in state practice
in relation to sovereignty over ports. 2 41 The International Court of
Justice recognized this when it noted in the Nicaragua decision that
it is "by virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate
access to its ports. 2 42 Further, UNCLOS recognizes a right to restrict
port access under article 211(3). This provision allows states to deny
a ship entry into a port for the purposes of preventing and controlling
marine pollution.243
The only international legal provision that may represent a
significant impediment to the introduction of a new security regime
appears in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").244
Article 5(2) provides for "Freedom of Transit" and states:
There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in
transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinction
shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin,
departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to
the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.
245
This suggests that engaging in container profiling and selective
targeting of transshipment cargo from certain states may in fact
contravene the GATT agreement. In the U.S. context, it is clear that
ships carrying containers originating from Iraq or Afghanistan would
be subject to special scrutiny by government authorities. There are
241. De La Fayette, supra note 240, at 1.
242. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ..C.J. 14, 111 (June 27).
243. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 211(3) (asserting that "[s]tates which
establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels
into their ports or internal waters or for a call at their off-shore terminals shall give
due publicity to such requirements and shall communicate them to-the competent
international organization"). The possibility of a nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapon onboard a ship arguably could qualify as an environmental threat and
would allow for a denial of access under UNCLOS.
244. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188. GATT 1994 annexes article 5 provisions and the
rest of the original 1947 GATT agreement.
245. Id. art. 5(2).
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security exceptions within the GATT agreement, but these appear
somewhat limited. Article 21(b) permits a state to override the
agreement in cases involving the trafficking of nuclear material,
guns, or during a general time of emergency.246 Further, GATT
allows any party to take action that violates the agreement if it is "in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security. '2 47 Whilst this
provision seems to suggest that security concerns may in some cases
be permitted to override other sections of the agreement, a new
security regime targeting certain vessels and cargo as a regular
matter of course might constitute a violation of the agreement.
One commentator has suggested that prohibitions against the
restriction of port access under World Trade Organization
agreements is "limited to those situations where the port state is
using port access as a means to deny entry of the good being carried
by the vessel and not in those situations where the port state's
concern is solely with the sub-standard condition of the vessel. ' 48 In
the case of a new maritime security regime, the concern relates to
both the goods and the vessel. In many respects, the ship and the
246. See id. art. 21(b) (setting forth the security exceptions). The security
provisions in Article 21of the GATT read as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a)to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of
which it considers
contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b)to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii)relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c)to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Id.
247. Id. art. 21(c).
248. Ted McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues in
International Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207, 222 (2000).
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
cargo that it carries are inseparable in terms of security risk, and a
new security regime will inevitably result in some form of trade
discrimination.2 49  This suggests the need for international
coordination that takes into account international trade and
commerce law when creating a solution.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the past forty years, the shift to containerization and the use
of larger ships has reduced costs and produced greater efficiencies
within the shipping industry.5 0 However, this shift to multimodal
systems and the use of "megaports" has simultaneously increased the
vulnerability of the shipping industry to maritime terrorism.' This
new vulnerability is very different from threats of the past in that it
cuts across national jurisdictions and involves a wide range of
parties, including ship owners, crews, manufacturers, and shipping
companies. The problem is complex and the maritime component is
simply one facet of a larger problem.
As this paper demonstrates, international maritime law has not
adapted to the changing nature of terrorist threats. 52 The 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea failed to deal with
maritime terrorism as an independent issue and, as a result, forced
terrorism at sea under the rubric of piracy. The 1982 Convention
simply adopted the historical conceptions of piracy contained in the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, along with all of its definitional
problems. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
249. See Hare, supra note 225, at 579 (explaining that the U.S. Coast Guard
already targets ships for inspection based on some of the above criteria). In many
respects, a new maritime security regime would differ significantly from the
existing port state control in terms of singling out ships of particular flags. As Hare
stated, "port state control has matured to the stage where it now recognizes the
need to accept the stark reality that some ships pose more of a problem than others.
Most MOUs now allow (indeed require) discrimination upon the basis of flag, age,
type of vessel, loan owner, operator, or even classification society." Id.
250. See supra notes 255-35 and accompanying text (describing the history of
containerization).
251. See supra notes 36-63 and accompanying text (explaining the repercussions
of the vulnerability of the maritime sector)
252. See supra notes 176-215 and accompanying text (analyzing the
inadequacies of existing international law relating to maritime terrorism).
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Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation moved away from
equating terrorism with the historical notions of piracy; however, it
focused strictly on the issues of jurisdiction and extradition.
Customary international law clearly indicates that states have a legal
obligation to prevent terrorist acts including acts that attempt to
cause a disruption to shipping.253 At present, there is a pressing need
for a new comprehensive multilateral instrument that focuses on the
prevention of maritime terrorism." 4 Due to the multi-modal nature of
modern freight services, a convention on prevention must involve not
just maritime stakeholders, but also manufacturers, rail companies,
and national customs authorities. In many respects, a new convention
is beyond the traditional scope of the IMO and may warrant the
establishment of a new international authority that can engage both
the maritime and the terrestrial elements of the problem.
253. See supra notes 128-175 and accompanying text (examining the
responsibility and duty of states to take action that would prevent terrorist attacks)
254. See supra notes 216-249 and accompanying text (making recommendations
for a new regime to respond to the current threats of maritime terrorism).
2002] 397
